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RIGHTS OF ACCESS AND THE SHAPE
OF THE INTERNET
MICHAEL. MADISON *
Abstract: This Article reviews recent developments in the law of access
to information, that is, cases involving click-through agreements, the
doctrine of trespass to chattels, the anti-circumvention provisions of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and civil claims under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act. Though the objects of these different doctrines
substantially overlap, the doctrines yield different presumptions
regarding the respective rights of information owners and consumers.
The Article reviews those presumptions in light of different
metaphorical premises on which courts rely: Internet-as-place, in the
trespass, DMCA, and CFAA contexts, and contract-as-assent, hi the click-
through context. It argues that the different doctrines should be
rendered consistent with one another and with an understanding of the
relevant metaphor that is based on consumer and user experiences of
the Internet, rather than on formal property-based constructs.
INTRODUCTION
When can the proprietor of a store of electronic information ex-
clude unwanted users? When does the access granted to an invited
user exclude unwanted use? These questions have challenged nearly a
generation of scholars and lawyers.' The questions sounded first in
computer software and later in electronic databases. They now also
concern the contents of Internet Web sites and access to the Internet,
itself. For the practicing lawyer, solutions arrived first via boxtop and
"shrinkwrap" licenses, later through "click-through" agreements, and
still later as practical, legal, and metaphorical limits of those devices
* Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. E-mail: madisonelaw,
pitt.edu . Thanks to Dan Hunter, David McGowan, and participants at the Boston College
Symposium on Intellectual Property. E-Commerce and the Internet, and the Chicago In-
tellectual Property Colloquium, for comments on earlier versions of this Article. Copyright
0 2003 Michael J. Madison.
The earliest commentary on shrinkwrap licenses appeared nearly twenty years ago.
Sec generally David Einhorn, The Enforceability of "Tcar-Me-Open" Software License Agreements, 67
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF, SOCY 509 (1985); Richard H. Stern, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of Mass
Marketed Software: Enforceable Contracts or 1Vhistling in the Dark, 11 RUTGERS COMPU'ITR &
TECH. Li. 51 (1985).
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emerged, through copyright law and its adjuncts, through property
law, and through anti-hacking legislation. As the commercial lawyer
now knows well, if undesirables cannot be excluded with contracts,
they can be excluded under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA"), under the doctrine of trespass to chattels, and even under
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA").2
As Internet access-to-information issues arose, some metaphorical
themes emerged. A consensus began to define the Internet as a vir-
tual "place" or "space,' or collection of "places" and "spaces," in many
of the same terms that we conventionally use to describe our physical
environment. 3 Electronic resources located "on" the Internet and
more generally "in" tangible computer media have become commodi-
ties along with the media themselves, "things" to which one does or
does not have access and that one can or cannot use. At the same
time, in an apparently unrelated development, contract-law meta-
phors, and particularly the notion of "contract-as-assent,' moved qui-
etly online as a result of the extension of boxtop-license jurispru-
dence.4
 When one acknowledges receipt of a benefit with knowledge
of limitations on use of that benefit, one "assents" contractually and is
bound to the limitation.
The result is an uneven blend of doctrine and metaphor. From
one perspective, issues of access to information, data, and computer
programs became issues of access to the places, spaces, and things
that constitute the Internet, a blend of two metaphors, one constitut-
ing "Internet-as-place," another constituting "information-as-thing." 5
Shrinkwrap and click-through jurisprudence developed around a sec-
ond perspective using a different pair of metaphors, "information-as-
thing" (still) but also "contract-as-assent." 6 The two perspectives yield
2 Sec discussion infra Part
3 See Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. Rex.
873,873-74 (1997) (noting competing metaphors, including "Information Superhighway."
Infobahn," "National Information Infrastructure," "cyberspace,".and the term "Internet"
itself). William J. Mitchell, Dean of the School of Architecture and Planning at MIT, wrote
what remains the canonical discussion of the 'place" metaphor in cyberspace in WILLIAM J.
MITCHELL, CITY OF BEM SPACE. PLACE, AND 'nit: INroBAtIN (1995). Early legal scholarship
pursuing this theme tended to focus on two issues. First, could the Internet be treated
legitimately as a distinct jurisprudential "place"? See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law
and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV, 1367,1378-81 (1996). Second,
when and how should the Internet be 'zoned" by analogy to conventional zoning of cities?
See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN, L. REV, 1403,1407-11 (1996).
4 See infra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
5 See infra Part MB—D.
5 See infra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
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different doctrinal results in areas that substantially overlap. Click-
through law has produced what appears to be a body of doctrine sen-
sitive (mostly) to both producer and consumer interests. In part be-
cause its metaphorical underpinnings are weak, the present doctrinal
equilibrium in this area is sensible yet tenuous.? Click-through juris-
prudence (the pairing of contract-as-assent. and information-as-thing
metaphors) does not bind the legal analysis to any conventional un-
derstanding of how users experience the Internet or computer soft-
ware. "Place" metaphors for the Internet, on the other hand, power-
fully (if sometimes inaccurately) capture the experience of the
Internet. So powerful are these metaphors that they largely have cap-
tured the imagination of legislators and judges, for whom the Inter-
net-as-place metaphor connotes the absolute power of the property
owner to exclude, and for whom a rule of "exclusion-from-computer"
naturally assumes a rule of "exclusion-from-information." In short,
click-through law draws the better doctrinal balance, based on actual
use of the Internet, but the Internet-as-place metaphor tells the better
story.
The problems here are twofold. The first is identifying the nor-
matively "correct" balance between the right to control access to and
use of presumptively private property, on the one hand, and two sorts
of interests—legitimate interests in access and use without compensa-
don, and interests in user awareness of limitations on access and
use—on the other, This Article does not directly address the question
of baselines, but it does argue that the default baseline now observed
in practice under doctrines emphasizing Internet-as-place mistakenly
applies a conclusive presumption that the "property" owner has an
absolute right to exclude. Contract-based cases that place a greater
burden on the "property" owner before granting such a power prop-
erly acknowledge, at least formally, that consumer interests must be
weighed before recognizing a legal power to exclude.
7 A recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit appears to cast
this conclusion into question. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317,1323-28
(Fed. Cit 2003); see also infra note 109. Even before shrinkwrap licensing moved online, it
was widely noted that the unwrapping of a package theoretically signified consumer "as-
sent" to a shrinkuTap license, but practically speaking was meaningless to virtually all soft-
ware users. A recent survey of click-through caselaw argues that the safer course, from the
producer's standpoint, is to design the click-through mechanism so that the consumer
cannot access the desired information without somehow affirmatively signifying assent to
any access restrictions. See Christina L. Kunz et al., Cliele-Tlimugh Agreements: Strategies for
Avoiding Disputes on l'alidity of Assent, 57 BUS. LAW. 401,405-06 (2001).
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The second problem is the inconsistency that results from apply-
ing these different bodies of law to essentially the same underlying
phenomena. Click-through law suggests that an information user is
not bound to limitations on information access without acknowledg-
ing those limitations. Trespass law, the DMCA, and the CFAA suggest
otherwise. Thus, an online information proprietor that takes no steps
to protect its data or copyrighted content may be better protected
under the DMCA, the CFAA, or trespass doctrine—areas in which ab-
solute property rules currently apply—than a producer that invests
time, energy, and money in an enforceable click-through agreement.
This is an odd result.8
 It is odd from the standpoint of the underlying
policy goal that these doctrines share (that is, investments in efforts to
produce and distribute intangible information should be legally pro-
tected as a way to preserve incentives to make those investments), odd
from the standpoint of trying to distinguish genuinely anti-competi-
tive uses of information products from benign uses, and odd from the
standpoint of simple fairness.
What does this mean in practical terms? I argue below that
shrinkwrap and click-through caselaw, the original line of argument
regulating "access" to electronic places, has outlived the contract
-as-
assent metaphor on which it relies. Place metaphors rule. Trespass,
DMCA, and CFAA cases so far suggest that courts have failed to ap-
preciate the depth and complexity of the Internet-as-place metaphor,
particularly in light of how users actually experience places on the
Internet. If courts are going to rely on a place-based sensibility in
evaluating claims that access to information should be restricted, they
should do so in a way that not only applies that sensibility consistently
across doctrinal lines, but also does so consistently with actual user
experience.9
 The goal is not to provide a metaphorically consistent
method for enhancing producer protection, nor to provide a meta-
8 At the least, it defies the principal (and some would say, only) law of economics:
there is no such thing as a free lunch.
9
 Reliance on "place" metaphors in common-law adjudication has not, therefore, nec-
essarily ''over-propertized" a common resource, in the property law sense, as some argue.
See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclo-
suw of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. REV. 354 (1909) (showing how enclosure of informa-
tion through laws supporting owners exclusive control pose risks to the diversity of our
information environment). We have not necessarily lost access to public resources online.
What we have lost is the ability to understand clearly what is accessible and what is not. The
law has failed adequately to define the complexities of the interests that surround us.
"Place," in legal practice, has an inappropriately flat dimension. That flatness inhabits
relevant non-property regimes as well as property law.
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phorically based argument for reviving the public domain. The goal is
to balance those two interests in a consistent way as they engage one
another across different doctrines. The Internet-as-place metaphor
should be interpreted doctrinally in ways that are consistent with user
experience of the Internet, rather than via formal, abstract, and abso-
lutist notions of "property."
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the key meta-
phors involved in these doctrines and the links between metaphor
and legal argument.i° Part II reviews application and reliance on
those metaphors in contract law, the law of property ("trespass to
chattels") online, and related and parallel statutory developments,
particularly the DMCA and the CFAA." I argue that the common in-
terests in "access" shared by these sources of law suggest that they be
reconciled. 12 To the extent that their inconsistency derives from prob-
lems of metaphor, then either the latter group (trespass, the DMCA,
and the CFAA) must be purged of the Internet-as-place metaphor, or
the metaphorical gap in contract law needs to be filled. I am skeptical
that "place" metaphors can be purged from Internet-related legal dis-
course. I argue, therefore, that the latter course is the better one. But
what should that course consist of?
Part III introduces and describes the idea that in CO111111011 usage
our place metaphors invoke and depend on a specific type of place-
based experience." We inhabit, appreciate, and control our "places"
by constituting mental "maps" of those places, relying on boundaries,
landmarks, and other visible points of orientation. Part III argues that
the legal developments described in Part. II rely on an Internet-as-
place metaphor but fail to leave us with comparable points of orienta-
tion." We are left with a "place" that we do not understand and can-
not properly control. The public interest is under served in this sce-
nario, and private interests cannot effectively rely on property rights
'0 See infra notes 17-50 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 51-268 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 51-268 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 269-300 and accompanying text
n An earlier version of this Article relied on the phrase "shotgun shack," in a title that
began "Living in a Shotgun Shack," as a way of noting that metaphorically, we cannot tell
whether the choices we make online lead us to a "shotgun shack" or a "beautiful house,"
phrases that the band Talking Heads once used to note the vast changes that may accom-
pany life's small decisions. See TALKING HEADS, Once in a Lifetime, on REMAIN IN LICA IT (Sire
Records 1980). The complete verse reads: "And you may find yourself living in a shotgun
shack/And you may find yourself in another part of the world/And you may find yourself
behind the wheel of a large automobile/And you may find yourself in a beautiful house,
with a beautiful wife/And you may ask yourself--Well ... How did I get here?" Id.
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for needed incentives to invest and produce. Part IV suggests how
some modifications in legal doctrine would bring it into closer har-
mony with the key metaphor.th This Part also briefly addresses objec-
tions to the proposal. 16
METAPHOR AND ACCESS
This Part briefly defines some of the basic parameters of the Arti-
cle as a whole, and it reviews the nature and the implications of three
metaphors around which electronic "access" law has been organized.
The Article as a whole concerns the phenomenon of "access" to
"information." I mean both of those terms in their broadest possible
senses. I use the term "information" rather than the producer-
oriented term "content" or the narrower "copyrighted material," be-
cause the cases and doctrines discussed touch on problems of con-
trolled access in a variety of situations, from computer systems them-
selves to Internet service, to uncopyrightable databases, to copy-
righted works." I use the term "access" broadly and necessarily some-
what loosely (and am mindful that in other contexts the term has
meanings and connotations that I do not wish to evoke) 18 to mean the
ability of individuals to see, hear, understand, use, and in many cases
reuse information content and/or services. 19
Given these central terms, the four legal doctrines with which the
Article is concerned revolve around three metaphors. These meta-
phors have played key roles in the development of the law of access.
As noted above, they are "contract-as-assent," "information-as-thing,"
and "Internet-as-place." Each metaphor must be explained, but the
significance of metaphor itself should first be noted, because the ar-
gument here is based on the premise that the language of legal doc-
trine makes a significant difference with respect to the organization
and application of the doctrine.
15 See infra notes 301-368 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 352-363 and accompanying text.
17
 These situations would include both information and services apparently controlled
by the user (software on the user's computer, or Internet service accessed by the user), as
well as those owned or controlled by others.
IS
 There are robust debates concerning "access" to various types of physical facilities,
particularly access by competitors to incumbent telecommunications facilities for purposes
of providing long-distance telephone service and for providing "access" to the Internet. Sec
generally James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access
Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE .). ON REG. 39 (2000).
15
 This necessarily includes the problem of access to information via computer pro-
gram or robot.
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Our use of language reflects the way in which we organize the
world of our experience. Metaphor is more than a mere literary de-
vice. From a cognitive science perspective, ImJetaphor is an expres-
sion forming a non-literal similarity comparison between two things,
which has an expressive or affective content and thereby carries
mean ing."2° A metaphor in this sense represents some typically more
abstract cluster of concepts (the "target" domain) that is understood
in terms of concepts from a typically more concrete, even physical
area (the "source" domain). 21 Such a metaphor operates as a concep-
tual system that helps its understand the target, in which features are
drawn from the source and applied to (or mapped onto) the target,
rather than as a direct, literal correspondence of the two domains. 22
The mapped similarities between the two likewise carry meaning over
from the source to the target. 23 To take a simple example, we often
conceptualize our physical and emotional well-being in financial
terms. An increase in well-being is a "gain" and thus good; a decrease
is a "loss" or a "cost" and therefore harmful. An example familiar to
lawyers is the metaphor corporation-as-person. 24 To cognitive scien-
tists, this use of language and its structures not only influences the
thoughts of speakers and affects our experiences with the world, but is
itself reflective of our underlying cognitive structures, derived from
experience. 25 Language, 2° and in particular metaphorical uses of Ian-
20 Dan Hunter, Reason is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50 EMORY U. 1197,
1209 (2001).
21 See id. at 1209-10.
22 See id.
23 See id. at 1209-14 (describing the basic contours of cognitive science approaches to
metaphor and its relative, analogy),
24 See generally Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fic-
tion, 61 Tut,. U. lttx. 563 (1987).
25 See Hunter, supra note 20, at 1214-27 (summarizing cognitive science research on
sources of mapping constraints). At one level, we may experience the world as we do. and
behave in certain ways, because at some level our use of the semantics and syntax of our
language predispose us to do so. In its strongest form, this argument is known as the Sapir-
Whorl Hypothesis, after the two men most closely associated with it. Sec 8.L. Whorl, The
• Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language, in LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND PERSON-
ALFIT 75-93 (Leslie Spier et al. eds.. 1941). See generally EDWARD SAPIR, LANGUAGE: AN
INTHonuctioN TO THE STUDY OF SPEEmt (1949); EDWARD SAPIR, SELECTED WREI1NGS OF
EDWARD SAPIR (David G. Man(telbaum ed., 1949); BENJAMIN LEE WHORL', LANGUAGE,
THOUGHT, AND REALITY: SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORE ( John B. Carroll
ed., 1956). The "universalist" or strongest form of the hypothesis has been challenged on
theoretical and empirical grounds. See. e.g., STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 59-
67 (1994). The weaker form of the hypothesis, known as linguistic relativity," argues that
manners of speech influence habits of thought and behavior and has been supported in
some experimental settings. See generally Paul Kay & Willett Kempton, What Is the Sapir-
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guage,27
 are as reflective of thought and behavior as they are determi-
nants. Metaphor contains unusual persuasive power because of its
ability to tap into tacit but shared conceptual structures. 28 We talk as
we do because of how we think and how we act.
Most [semantic] categorization is automatic and uncon-
scious, and if we become aware of it at all, it is only in prob-
lematic cases. In moving about the world, we automatically
categorize people, animals, and physical objects, both natu-
ral and man-made. This sometimes leads to the impression
that we just categorize things as they are, that things come in
natural kinds, and that our categories of mind naturally fit
the kinds of things there are in the world. But a large pro-
portion of our categories are not categories of things, they
are categories of abstract entities. We categorize events, ac-
tions, emotions, spatial relationships, social relationships,
and abstract entities of an enormous range: governments,
illnesses, and entities in both scientific and folk theories, like
electrons and colds. 29
Our semantic categories and our metaphors are not mere byproducts
of (and inputs for) political debate. They are largely built on our ex-
periences.'"
Whorf Hypothesis?, 86 Am. ANTHROPOLOGIST 65 (1984); Alan Ramsey, Wording, Meaning. and
Linguistic Ideology, 92 Ass. AicrintoroLoots•r 346 (1990). My argument does not directly
rely on the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis in either form, but there is a strong intuitive sense that
our formal linguistic classifications influence our legal classifications. On the role of meta-
phor in shaping the law, see generally ANTHONY G. /Us-run/km jettome BRUNER, M Dm-
ixo THE LAW 189-92 (2000); STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE,
AND MINI) (2001).
26 Sec GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES RE-
VEAL ABOUT 'EHE MIND 58 (1987).
27
 See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BV 3-6 (1980);
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A nun Gume •o POETIC
METAPHOR, at	 (1989). A useful recent synthesis of research on metaphor and its
application to legal reasoning is Thomas W. Jo°, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor
in Corporations Law, 35 U.C. DAvas L. REV, 779 (2002). Ott Lakoffian theory and the Inter-
net in particular, see Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place, and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticont-
owns, 91 CAL. L. Rev. 439 (2003).
28 Sec Hunter, supra note 20, at 1208-10; joo, supra note 27, at 782-88; see also Lawrence
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. REV. 943,958-61 (1995) (observing
that social meanings draw power from uncontested or Invisible" expectations).
29 LAKOFF, supra note 26, at 6.
90 See id. at 330-34.
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As language reflects our underlying experience, it likewise im-
ports the normative implications of that experience. 31 Metaphor helps
us to communicate effectively because it. relies on devices the rhetori-
cal validity of which are presumptively accepted in their cultural con-
text."
For the same reasons that schemas and metaphors give us
power to conceptualize and reason, so they have power over
us. Anything that we rely on constantly, unconsciously, and
automatically is so much part of us that. it cannot be easily re-
sisted, in large measure because it is barely even noticed. To
the extent that we use a conceptual schema or a conceptual
metaphor, we accept its validity. Consequently, when
someone else uses it, we are predisposed to accept its valid-
ity."
The benefit of metaphor derives therefore not only from communica-
tion of common conceptual structures, but also from the normative
implications of those structures. 34 Metaphors in practice provide an
organizing vocabulary that has normative power." To describe one
(difficult) thing in terms of another (easier) thing is not merely to
argue that the first is like the second, though this is one possible use of
metaphor. A metaphor in the form "source-as-target" suggests a man-
ner of not only describing but also evaluating the source using de-
scriptors and analyses developed for the target." It is this use of
metaphor with which this Article is concerned. In current access doc-
trines, there are three key metaphors of this type.
A. Contract-as-Assent
Contract law scholarship has collected a number of organizing
schemas (contract-as-bargain, contract-as-relationship), and among
these the formalist contract-as-assent metaphor has a respectable
al See LAROFT & TURNER, supra note 27, at 62-65.
32 See id.
33 See id. at 63.
14 See id. at 65 ("We not only import entities and structure from the source domain to
the target domain, we also carry over the way we evaluate the entities in the source do.
main."); Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1051-54
(2002); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1143-46 (1989).
3' See LAKOFF & JOIINSON, stfprn note 27, at 3-6,
86 See id.
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pedigree. The model has been well-defended and well-critiqued else-
where. 57 Here, I wish only to point out the argumentative implications
of the metaphor, which are developed in the cases discussed in the
next Part. Contract-as-assent signifies that the parties' choices deter-
mine their legal obligations, that they in fact have choices to make,
that they are capable of making those choices, and that their actions
accurately reflect their choices. The metaphor may also imply that the
parties are free from coercive influences, and that they possess infor-
mation sufficient to enable them to make a choice. There is no doubt
that this is a highly artificial and formal model." As we see below, it
appears to be the model of the moment.
B. Information-as-Thing
"Access" to information suggests, among other things, that there
is an object of the access relationship, something to be obtained.
Though "information" is an intangible, that intangible is necessarily
commodified not only by virtue of being made the object of a com-
mercial transaction, but also by virtue of the language that surrounds
it.39 We want access to information, an object. Objects are created,
bought, sold, and even shared; these transactions become the sub-
strate of broader regulation both of copyrighted and non-copyrighted
"works" and of use of other electronic resources.0 The influence of
the information-as-thing metaphor appears, at least implicitly and oc-
casionally explicitly, in both click-through and non-dick-through ac-
cess jurisprudence.
37 Compate Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986)
(defending consent model), with Richard Croswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and The
Philosophy of Promising, 88 (+licit. L. REv. 489 (1989) (critiquing autonomy-based models of
contract).
39 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1743, 1759-60 (2000); Ralph James Mooney, The New Concepturdisin in Contract Law, 74 OR.
1.. REV. 1131, 1177 (1995):
39
 It may also be commodified technologically. See Michael Buckland, Information as
Thing, 42 J. Am. Soc, INro. Sct. 351, 358 (1991).
40 Cf. THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION, at vii Viii (Kluwer Law Mel. Informa-
tion Law Series No. 11, Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002) (describing
information as subject to the "rough and tumble of the marketplace - and copyright law as
providing a legal groundwork for its propertization); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Informa-
tion Products: A Challenge to Intellectual Property Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. [WEI. L. & Pot- 897, 897-
900 (1988). On the "thingification" of legal concepts, see Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLum. L. REV. 809, 811 (1935); Michael A. Heller,
The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1193-94 & n.162 (1999).
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C. Internet-as-Place
Place and space metaphors for online interactions and environ-
ments are inescapable. Scholars have filled academic journals, and
judges have filled opinions, with analyses of the "right" metaphor for
the Internet, 4 t without enduring success. Descriptively, however, as use
of the Internet has increased and as it has become more embedded in
different aspects of society at large, property-based descriptors have
become well entrenched in both legal and popular usage. 42 It is
difficult to conceive of educating Internet users today to stop using
phrases such as "Uniform [or Universal' Resource Lawton" "Web site,"
41 See, e.g., Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The rooftops
of our past have evolved into the internet domain names of our present. We find that the
domain name is a type of public expression, no different in scope than a billboard or a
pulpit ...."); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v, W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1057 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing World Wide Web as "a marketing and advertising facility,"
and a "marketing and advertising tool"); Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Lou-
don]) County Library, 2 F. Stipp. 2d 783, 793-94 (E.D. Va. 1998) (IA) library must actually
expend resources to restrict Internet access to a publication that is otherwise immediately
available. In effect, by purchasing one such publication, the library has purchased them
all. The Internet therefore more closely resembles plaintiffs' analogy of a collection of
encyclopedias from which defendants have laboriously redacted portions deemed unfit for
library patrons."); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Stipp. 824, 836-37 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (describing
World Wide Web as "a single body of knowledge"), affd sub nom., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844 (1997); A, Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Ano-
nymity. Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases. 15 J.L. & Cont. 395, 507 (1996) (suggesting
rejection of "information ocean" metaphor in favor of "information fishbowl"); A. Michael
Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography. The Clipper Chip, and the Constitution. 143 U.
PA. L. Ray. 709, 859-80 (1995) (noting variety of metaphors used to describe cryptography
and concerns embedded in choice of metaphor); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights
and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY Twit. L.J.
561, 581-96 (2001) (comparing implications of "website as book" metaphor with "website
as real property" metaphor); Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and
Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1208 (2002) (developing a cyber-
space metaphor by analogy to feudal social relations). Maureen O'Rourke previewed some
of the legal issues discussed in this Article in Maureen O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace:
Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 654-701 (1998), arguing that the
legal system needed to erect virtual "fences" on the Internet to preserve appropriate
boundaries between intellectual property doctrines and related common law approaches.
42 David Post and David Johnson argued in a seminal article in 1996 that unique, cross-
border features of cyberspace meant that cyberspace should be characterized as a distinct
place for purposes of legal analysis. See Johnson & Post. supra note 3, at 1370-80. Dan
Hunter, who catalogues the manifest ways in which the Internet is treated as a metaphori-
cal "place" by judges. argues that dislodging the metaphor is a central task facing judges
and lawmakers but ultimately despairs of success. See Hunter, supra note 27. Mark Letnley.
while agreeing with Hunter's diagnosis, offers some prescriptions for a partial cure. From
his perspective, courts using analogical decisionmaking techniques have failed to appreci-
ate the complexity of place and space in the off-tine legal world. See generally Mark A. Lem-
ley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L REV. 521-(2003).
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"domain name," "cybersquatting," "home page," or electronic mail "ad-
dress." We describe the Internet in place and space terms in part be-
cause that is how we understand and experience it. "[N]o matter
where you go ... there you are," as the celluloid philosopher Bucka-
roo Banzai once said,'" and it follows that wherever you "go" "on" the
Internet, you sense that you are somewhere other than sitting in front
of a computer monitor:" The argumentative vocabulary that this
metaphor produces is relatively thin once we move beyond descrip-
tions of Internet phenomena. Is the Internet really a metaphorical
place? Or is it a metaphorical space? 45 Open (space), or bounded
(place), or partly both? Even speaking metaphorically; is the Internet,
or cyberspace, the correct target domain? Perhaps the World Wide
Web, or Web sites, would be better. 46 In the cases and doctrines de-
43 THE ADVENTURES OF BUCKAROO BANZAI ACROSS TUE FIC.11111 DIMENSION! (MGM
Studios 1984).
44 Johnson and Post describe the source of the usage as the persistence of information
available on the Internet and the fact that this information is available broadly to large
numbers of individuals. SecJohnson tte Post, supra note 3, at 1379. In the context of access
to a Web site under the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act, however, at least one court
has held that a Web site is not a place, at least under the terms of that statute. Sec Access
Not Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
45
 Analyses of the "architecture" of the Internet coexist peaceably with analyses of the
Internet as "place." Compare LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTIIER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
24-42 (1999) (analyzing the architecture of the Internet), with James Boyle, The Public
Domain: The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37-44 (2003) (analyzing the Internet as a "commons," that is, a
"place"). The paradox that the Internet is simultaneously an environment (a place) and an
object in that environment (a metaphorical building, which can be described in terms of
its "architecture") may not matter for present purposes. In other contexts, emphases on
the environmental attributes of the Internet may conflict with prescriptions for responsible
(architectural) development.
46 My concern in this Article is with what AOchai Benkler distinguished as the content
"layer" of the Internet, rather than with its "logical" or physical "layers." Vochai Belittler,
From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons
and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562 (2000). The analytic difficulty is that although
one might distinguish physical machines, wires, and electrons (physical layer) front the
software protocols that coordinate the activity of these machines and electrons (logical
layer) from the information perceived on computer screens by end-users (subdivided by
server, protocol, and Web site, among other things) (content layer), no one layer can be
completely physically or analytically divorced from any other. Traditional lines between law
and artifact, and text and machine, are being blurred. Sec generally Randal C. Picker, From
Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copy-
right, 70 11. Cm. L. REV. 281 (2003) (arguing that because access to information is no
longer defined automatically by the character of the object in which the information is
embedded, a re-assessment of policy and other access-regarding concerns is necessary);
Margaret Jane Radii], Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70
FORDIIAM L. REV. 1125 (2002) (describing implications of decline of traditional distinc-
tions between intangible text and tangible machine); Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal Im-
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scribed in the next Part, courts have supplied a place-based vocabu-
lary that echoes the formalism of the contract-as-assent metaphor:
"place" means property, property means private property, and private
property means the owner's absolute right. to exclude.
As these references to the property owner's "absolute right to ex-
clude" suggest, metaphors bring risks as well as benefits. The most
significant risk is that the metaphor will become unmoored from its
conceptual underpinnings, and the linguistic formulation will be
taken literally. 47 The institution of contract, and individual contracts
themselves, are not truly constituted by assent alone. Authentic, sub-
jective assent of each party need not be proved before a promissory
obligation will be enforced. 48 Information as such is not a thing, al-
though information can be collected and packaged in a commoclifiecl
form,49 The Internet is not really a place, nor is it really a parcel (or
collection of parcels) of real property. Those features of the Internet.
that suggest to us that in some ways, it resembles a place should not
be mistaken for evidence that the Internet is precisely like a place."
As the following analysis suggests, courts that describe the Internet
plications of Biological "Lock-Out" Systems (working paper, on file with author) (describ-
ing research of historians of science and technology). But see Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in
Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodo.ky of "Rights Managrownt,"97 Micn. L. REV. 462, 531-32
(1998) (describing the "Cohen theorem," which states that consumers should have the
right to hack technological rights management systems to defend privileges afforded tradi-
tionally by copyright law). For this reason, among others, I do not distinguish in this Arti-
cle between the Internet" and "cyberspace."
47 Ian R. Kerr, Mind Your Metaphors: An Examination of the Inefficacy Argument as a Reason
Against Regulating On-Line Conduct, in ETHICS AND ELECTRONIC, INFORMATION IN 111E
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 231, 233-34 (Lester J. Pourciau ed., 1999) (updating an argu-
ment Lon Fuller originally offered in L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363 (1930)).
48 See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORMIAM L REV. 627, 628-30
(2002); Joseph M. Perilla, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and ',dope-
Maori, 69 FoRtnim L. REV. 427, 427-29 (2000) (detailing the development of objective
standards in contract formation).
49 See Vochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions,
53 VAN!). L. REV. 2063, 2065-77 (2000); see also Dan Schiller. How to Think About Informa-
tion, in THE Porn-Iced. ECONOMY OF INFORMATION 27, 32-33 (Vincent Mosco & Janet
Wasko eds., 1988) (distinguishing between "information as resource," presumptively un-
owned and available to all, and "information as commodity," presumptively ownable and
tradable).
" See GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937) Cr] here is no
there there."); Lemley, supra note 42 (describing public goods attributes of informational
content of cyberspace that distinguish it from tangible property); cf. Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Stipp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997) ("The Internet has no territo-
rial boundaries. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the Internet is concerned, not
only is there perhaps no there there,' the 'there' is everywhere where there is Internet ac-
cess.").
446	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 44:433
using place metaphors fundamentally err if they explicitly or implic-
itly assume that the Internet and cyberspace and all that it contains
actually do consist of or operate precisely like real property.
The point of this Part has been primarily descriptive, to explain
the role of metaphor in argument generally, and to identify the key
metaphors at work in different doctrines regulating "access" to "in-
formation." There is an implicit normative critique, as well, preview-
ing the argument of Part III: metaphors can mislead as well as de-
scribe, and metaphors can be persuasive in both misleading and
accurate ways. As the next Part explains, in the click-through context,
contract-as-assent coupled with information-as-thing produces a mis-
leading but ultimately unpersuasive narrative. In the trespass, DMCA,
and CFAA contexts, information-as-thing coupled with Internet-as-
place produces a misleading result. The analysis focuses on the assent
and place metaphors, treating the information-as-thing metaphor
largely as a constant.
IL MANAGING RIGHTS OF ACCESS: CLICK-THROUGH AGREEMENTS,
TRESPASS TO CHATTELS, THE DMCA, AND THE CFAA
This Part briefly surveys the history and current status of four
sources of law that regulate access to information stored electroni-
cally, principally (but not exclusively) on computer networks: com-
mon-law contract law as applied to click-through agreements, 51 the
common-law doctrine of trespass to chattels as applied to computer
networks,52 the DMCA,53 and the CFAA. 54 Each of these bodies of law
St Sec infra notes 56-139 and accompanying text.
S2 See infra notes 140-183 and accompanying text.
SS Sec infra notes 184-224 and accompanying text
54 Sec infra notes 225-268 and accompanying text. I do not separately discuss the pro-
posed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA") (2002), which. in
those jurisdictions where it is in effect, specifically characterizes licenses" for access to
electronic information as contracts and validates the formation of such contracts via click-
wrap and click-through mechanisms. The model UCITA proposal is available at
littp://wwwlaw,upenn,edu/bll/ulchilc.htm#ucita. UCITA has been adopted wholly or
partly in Maryland and in Virginia. Iowa, North Carolina. and West Virginia have adopted
anti-UCITA "bomb shelter" legislation, which denies enforcement of contracts governed
by UCITA against residents of those states. Sections 208 and 209 of UCITA permit the
formation of contracts using shrinkwrap and click-through mechanisms, including
mechanisms that require assent and payment for access before all terms are disclosed to
the offeree. Sections 112 and 113 require that the offeree have an "opportunity to review"
and to reject post-assent contract terms before such terms can be enforced, but the "op-
portunity to review* need not do more than bring the terms to the attention of a reason-
able person.
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has developed largely independently of the others, not entirely un-
aware of their related nature but. nonetheless ill-equipped, based on
the internal dynamics of their respective doctrinal objectives, to deal
alone with the broader policy issues that they share.55 The Part starts
with a very brief history and overview of click-through contract law. In
the Sections that follow this overview, I note the emergence of the
Internet-as-place metaphor and the resulting shift to property-based
doctrine. The corresponding change in doctrinal emphasis, from mu-
tual assent to the interests of the property owner, leads to virtually no
consideration of the ability of would-be defendants to avoid causing
harm to the plaintiff. This framework is applied, moreover, in an elec-
tronic context (computer networks, and the Internet in particular) in
which computer users have little or no ability to avoid inflicting the
very type of harm that courts condemn.
A. Click-Through Agreements
"Click-through" agreements derive from "shrinkwrap" agree-
ments, Slirinkwrap agreements took their name from software com-
panies' practice of distributing boxed computer programs to custom-
ers tinder standardized terms that were "offered" on the face of, and
sometimes inside, the boxes themselves." These computer programs
55 From the information producer or proprietor standpoint, the question is whether
and how the proprietor can recover enough money via exploitation of the information or
otherwise to preserve appropriate incentives to create and distribute information-related
products. From the consumer or public standpoint, the question is whether and how to
obtain and maintain some desirable level of access to and use of information-related
products and information itself needed for industrial, cultural, community, political,
and/or individual development. Each of the four bodies of law discussed in this Article has
been used, at least in significant part, to manage perceived tradeoffs between those two
points of view. Other sources of "access" law are not considered explicitly, but could be
viewed as of a piece with these four. Sec. e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th
Cu'. 2002) (discussing law of hyperlinks).
Bo This account is adapted from Michael J. Madison, Legal-Warr: Contract and Copyright
in the Digital Age, 67 FottonAm L. Rev. 1025, 1055-58 (1998). Whether terms stated on the
outside of a package of computer software, or on a card inside the package, or provided
during a download or installation process for software delivered via computer network,
were reasonably understood by the user as an "offer" is a question that has never been
thoroughly analyzed by a court. Cf. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONIRAC15 § 4.26, at 298 (3d
ed. 1999) (Courts may reject enforcement of a standardized contract form "on the ground
that it was not of a type that would reasonably appear to the recipient to contain the terms
of a proposed contract. Even under the objective theory, it can be reasoned that such a
writing is not an offer at all."). Because virtually all of the debate has centered on the ef-
fectiveness of the user's alleged assent, sometimes characterized as the question of whether
the user understood that the act of opening, clicking, or retaining amounted to an act of
contractual significance, the summary and analysis that follow does so as well.
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were typically delivered on diskettes or tapes packaged in book-sized
boxes." Because the boxed software was often not purchased from
the software developer, proposing an "offer" in this way allowed the
software developer, via distribution of the product by a third-party, to
create the appearance of a direct contractual relationship between
developer and end-user. 56 Customers "accepted" the terms of the
agreements, according to the text of the agreements, by opening the
plastic shrinkwrap packaging that encased the boxes.59
The combination of graphical user interfaces for software and
delivery of computer software via computer networks led to the use of
"shrinkwrap" agreements manifested in software itself rather than on
cards or product packaging. 60 From the term "shrinkwrap," software
companies developed the neologisms "click-wrap," "click-through,"
and "click-on" agreements.°' Each of these terms today refers to
mechanisms employed with respect to both pre-packaged computer
software and databases, and software and data delivered via the Inter-
net or other computer network, as to which the customer or end-user
is permitted to access and/or use the program, service, or data only
after "clicking" on one or more screen icons labeled "I Accept," "I
Agree," or the like. 62 Click-through agreements frequently serve as the
basis for two-party transactions, in addition to bridging gaps between
two contracting parties separated by a third-party distributor.°
The shrinkwrap (and later click-through) mechanism developed
to deal with the novelty of software companies' insistence that their
copyrighted code was "licensed," rather than "sold" to each consumer,
so that the companies were not required by the first sale doctrine to
67 Madison, supra note 56, at 1055-56.
58 Id.
59 Id. Boxtop or "tear-me-open" licenses operated similarly. The customer "accepted"
the offered terms by opening the box in which the software was delivered. License terms
appeared on the top of the box. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap
Licenses, 68 S. CAL L. REV. 1239,1241-45 (1995).
63
 Madison, supra note 56, at 1056-58.
61 Id.
62 Id. Some commercial lawyers distinguish between "click-wrap" (i.e., assent mani-
fested by clicking on an "1 Accept" or "I Agree" icon) and "click-through" or "click-on"
agreements (i.e., assent to terms of use posted on a Web site home page that accompanies
the installation of a computer program, manifested by clicking on a link to an interior
page of a Web site). The term "browse-wrap" has also been used to refer to arguments by
Web site owners that those who browse a Web site "agree" to Terms of Use posted on the
site, merely by accessing the site. See Register.com, Inc. v. ‘rerio, Inc., 126 F. Stipp. 2d 238.
245-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
63 Sec Madison, supra note 56, at 1056.
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give up their exclusive rights to distribute these works. 64 The mecha-
nism, in other words, was expressly designed to require that the con-
sumer (User) agree that "access" to the computer software was limited
by the express terms of the licensees The license typically prohibited
precisely the kinds of "access" that users of copyrighted works enjoy
once they acquire a tangible "copy" of a copyrighted work.°6 if the
program were installed on the first user's computer, that user might.
give or sell the medium (disk or tape) bearing the program to a sec-
ond user, so that the second user could install the computer program
on a second machine, while the first user retained use of the program
on the initial machine. Assuming that the license limited use of the
program to one user or one computer, the shrinkwrap license cut off
unauthorized second points of "access."
From this perspective, the information proprietor's impulse to
use a click-through agreement to protect the commercial value of
computer programs and databases is entirely understandable, 67 even
if the distinction between tangible property and intangible intellec-
tual property rights, on which the first sale doctrine depends, is a mat-
ter of poorly understood copyright law metaphysics when applied in
the electronic context. 68 That impulse has been sharpened by the
growth both in the number and value of online commercial data-
bases, particularly because American copyright law provides little legal
64 The first sale doctrine in copyright law restrains application of the copyright owner's
exclusive right to distribute the copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3), 109(a) (2000).
Once the owner has distributed a particular copy of the work in a "first sale," the owner
has no further legal right to control further disposal of that copy. See id. §§ 106(3) (exclu-
sive right to distribute copies of the work), 109(a) (first sale defense).
65 Madison, supra note 56. at 1057-58.
66 Id. at 1058-59.
67 Sec Lemley, supra note 59, at 1242-48; Madison, supra note 56, at 1055-76.
68 Cf. McDonald's Corp. v. Shop at Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. al 801, 803-04, 817 (M.D.
Tenn. 2000) (refusing to enforce, in context of trademark case, "license" label affixed to
bag containing Beanie Baby toys purchased by defendant). Compare Softman Prods. Co. v.
Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Stipp. 2d 1075, 1082-85 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (declining to recognize
"license" of tangible copies of copyrighted computer programs), with Adobe Sys., Inc. v.
Stargate Software hic., 216 F. Stipp. 2d 1051, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (enforcing software
license), The doctrinal confusion that exists in this area is carefully summarized in David
Ninuner et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL L. REV. 17, 34-41 (1999).
The distinction between the tangible and die intangible is also a matter of poorly under-
stood metaphysics in the commercial law context. Proposed revisions to Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code would clarify its scope by specifically excluding transactions in
"computer information," including such transactions where the only "goods" involved are
media on which the "computer information" is encoded. Sec U.C.C. Art. 2 (Proposed
Official Draft of Amendments to Article 2—Sales, 2002), available at
http://www.law.upenn. edu/bll/nic/ucc2/annua12002.htm.
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protection to database owners.° Fuzzy lines among software, data,
and services online have led to the proliferation of click-through
agreements in the service-provider context. The spread of electronic
content in all its many contemporary forms and the low cost of pre-
senting users with click-through icons and links means that these
agreements have been a relatively straightforward way for providers
and producers to establish apparently binding contractual relation-
ships with nearly everyone, regulating access to and use of electronic
information.
Because for all the world these "licenses" look like "contracts,"
whether they are enforceable (as to both commercial terms, such as a
69 Computer programs are copyrightable literary works. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
102(a); Fonar Corp, v. Domenick, 105 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997). Computer databases, at
least in the absence of some minimal creativity in the selection or arrangement of dab, are
not. See Feist Pubrns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362-64 (1991). Since the
decision in Feist, database producers have sought refuge in a variety of legal strategies.
Efforts in Congress to obtain federal legislative protection for databases have been ongo-
ing for some time. Efforts to address the problem via application of the tort of misappro-
priation, based on the Supreme Court's decision in International News Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), have yielded mixed results. Compare Nat'l Basketball Ass'n
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 854 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that real-time transmission of
basketball scores was not misappropriation), with Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA
Tour, Inc., 117 F. Stipp. 2d 1322, 1328-29 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (finding that real-time trans-
mission of golf scores was misappropriation). In Europe, database providers have had
more success in restricting access based on unfair competition principles, using sui genesis
legal Protection of electronic databases. See, e.g., British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William
Hill Org. Ltd., [2001] R.P.C. 31, 2001 WL 98034 (Eng.) (Ch.), rev'd [2002] E.C.D.R. 4,
2001 WL 825162 (Eng.) (C.A.) (interpreting the European Parliament and Council Direc-
tive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996, European Database Directive, 1996 (L 77) 20. on the
Legal Protection of Databases). For discussion of a Danish case, see EU Database Directive
Invoked to Support Order Barring Deep Linking to News Sites, 7 ELECTRONIC Cont. & L. REP.
(BNA) 714, 714-15 ( July 17, 2002), Danish Newspapers Win Deep Linking Battle, EUROPEME-
DIA, July 8, 2002, 2002 WL 10691019, and Deep Link Foes Get Another Win, WIRED NEWS, July
8, 2002, at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,53697,00.html (partial translation
of opinion at http://www.newsboostercom/?pg-=judge&lan=eng)
 (all reporting on Dan-
ish Newspaper Publishers' Ass'n v. Newsbooster.com
 ApS (Bailiff's Court of Copenhagen.
Denmark, July 5, 2002)). For a discussion of a German case, see Deep Linking Takes Another
Blow, WIRED NEWS, July 25, 2002, at http://wwwwired.com/news/politics/0.1283,
54083,00.html (reporting on Main post v. Newsclub (Upper Court Munich, July 2002)). For
discussion of a Dutch case, see Armand Kilian, Dutch Supreme Court Decision Broadens Pivtec-
lion of Databases, 16 \Volum INTELL. PROP. REP, (BNA) No. 6, at 8 ( June 2002) and Somme
Court Bans Unauthorised Deeplinking, EUROPENIEDIA; Mar. 27, 2002, at hup://www.europe-
media.net/shownews.asp?ArticlelD=96668cPrint=
 true (reporting on Netherlands ASSOC.
of Realtors v. De Telegraaf (Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Mar. 22. 2002)). For a
discussion of these and other, similar cases, see P. Berm Hugenholtz, The New Database
Right: Early Case Law from Europe, Presentation at the Ninth Annual Conference on In-
ternational IP Law and Policy, Fordham University School of Law (Apr, 15-20, 2001),
available at http://wwwivirm
 publications/hugenholtz/ford ham2001.html.
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choice of forum and limitation of remedy, and scope-of-use terms) is a
question that has been answered primarily in terms of the law of offer
and acceptance, or contract-as-assent, rather than in terms of the le-
gitimacy of restrictions on access to the underlying computer system,
service, data, or work. Answering the question in contractual terms is
also due largely to the typical presence of terms that address the par-
ties' commercial relationship (limitations of liability and warranty,
choice of law, and choice of forum) as well as use of the underlying
program, data, or service. Many of the available decisions interpreting
shrinkwrap and click-through licenses concern choice-of-forum and
warranty issues, areas of law that often bring with them specialized
perspectives on contract enforcement, including special solicitude for
promoting commercial transactions 70 and private forms of dispute
resolution." What started as a regime of access control for computer
programs has benefited substantially from presumptions in commer-
cial law that promote shrinkwrap and click-through forms for reasons
having nothing to do with access to information.
The commercial law approach has been tempered by courts' in-
creasing recollection of the premise that "it takes two" to make a con-
tract. As the following brief history recounts, although shrinkwrap
and click-through law lacks any compelling synthesizing metaphor, 72 it
7° See generally Fred H. Miller. The Uniform Commetrial Code: IOU the Experiment Continue!,
43 NIERCER L. REV. 799 (1992) (describing success of the UCC in promoting uniformity in
commercial practice), Sections 2-204 and 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
abandon the common-law "mirror image rule" of contract formation via offer and accep-
tance in favor of a more pragmatic "expression of acceptance" framework, exemplify the
phenomenon. SeeU.C.C.§§ 2-204, -207 (2001).
71 Sec 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (Federal Arbitration Act presumption in favor of enforce-
ment of agreements to arbitrate); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589,
597 (1991) (reflecting strong federal policy supporting forum selection clauses); Moses H.
Cone Metu'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (referring to liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1. 8-15 (1972) (also reflecting strong federal policy supporting forum selection clauses).
There are many examples of the forum selection clause bias at work in electronic informa-
tion contexts. See, e.g., Graves v. Pikulski, 115 F. Stipp. 2d 931, 934-35 (S.D. Ili. 2000);
Decker v. Circus Circus Hotel, 49 F. Stipp. 2d 743, 748 (D.N.J. 1999); cf. Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1294, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (enforcing forum selection clause in
printed contract of adhesion governing access to Roundup Ready seed technology). See
generally Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App. 2001).
Shrinkwrap law under the contract-as-assent metaphor has never made much sense
to software users because it had nothing to do with how they acquired or used software. Sec
Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narratim 76 VA. L. REv. 937, 983-
85, 980-95 (1990) (describing problem of standard form contracts as problem of narra-
tive). To the extent that sections 2-204 and 2-207 of the UCC manifest a narrative of "the
deal," the deal is signified by the acts of exchanging forms. Sec U.C.C. §§ 2.204, -207. In
452	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 44:933
has largely evolved to the point of at least formal recognition of the
need for user "acknowledgement" of a license or access control of-
fered by an information proprietor. To the extent that courts focus on
contract formation issues, the law has worked (precariously) to bal-
ance proprietor and user interests."
1. Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology
Three cases serve as landmarks in the evolution of click-through
law. The first addressed an authentic boxtop license, printed on the
outside of a package that contained a copy of a computer program,
and deserves only brief mention. 74 Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. sold
computer systems that included software purchased from The Soft-
ware Link ("TSL")." The systems malfunctioned, and Step-Saver sued
TSL for breach of warranty." TSL argued that form language printed
on the top of the packaging in which it delivered its software to Step-
Saver constituted the complete agreement of the parties, and that
with that language TSL had effectively disclaimed any warranties. 77
The U.S. Court. of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the trial
court's ruling in favor of TSL with respect to Step-Saver's warranty
practice. specific terms were rarely negotiated, and enforcement was denied only when a
particular term exceeded standard commercial expectations. Sending the form, in other
words, was more important titan what the form said, so long as standard commercial prac-
tice was observed. Without two commercial parties, however. the ritual was abstracted and
decontextualized into "open the box" (or 'click on the icon"), agree to the terms. Without
a practice of contracting to which the law attached, no one and no court has articulated
any persuasive reason, aside from the internal logic of judicial decisionmaking, to adhere
to the contract-as-assent model. Sec Margaret Jane Raclin, Humans, Computers, and Binding
Commitment, 75 IND, L.J. 1125,1126-28 (1999).
7s
 An important sub-theme in these cases is the occasional willingness of courts to ac-
cept the enforceability of a click-through or shrinkwrap agreement as given and proceed
to analysis of the enforceability of particular contract terms. The recent decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317,
1323-27(2003), which held that a "no reverse engineering" clause in a shrinkwrap license
for packaged computer software was not preempted by federal copyright law, suffers from
precisely this flaw. The court engaged in no analysis whatsoever of the enforceability of the
license as a matter of contract law. The court compounded this omission by characterizing
the commercial transaction as a "sale.* Sec id. at 1322. If the software were in fact "sold,"
then there was no license, and the "no reverse engineering" clause would clearly be pre-
empted under the "first sale doctrine."
74 Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91,96 (3d Cir. 1991).
76
 Id, at 93.
76 Id. at 94.
77 Id. at 94-95.
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claims. 78 In effect, the court of appeals held that the boxtop license
was not enforceable. 79
The details of the coures analysis are relatively unimportant. here,
but certain of its premises have had lasting impact. First, the court
accepted the parties' agreement that the terminals and the program
were "goods" within the meaning of Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code ("UCC"), 80 and it therefore analyzed the legal effect of
the parties' offer-and-acceptance correspondence under the rules of
section 2-207 of that Article. 8' Second, given the sequence of the par-
ties' order and shipment correspondence, the court concluded that
TSL's warranty limitation did not become part of the parties' agree-
ment because it was proposed, via boxtop license, after the commer-
cial agreement had been reached. 82 Each package of the software de-
livered by TSL had printed on its top a "license" that purported to
disclaim all relevant warranties, that limited the purchaser to a return-
and-replace remedy, and that stated that acceptance of the terms of
the license occurred when the box was opened. 83 The warranty limita-
tion represented a "material alteration" to the contract already
formed. Implicitly, but never explicitly, the court concluded that Step-
Saver had not "accepted" or assented to this new term merely by
opening the box. 84
78 Id. at 108.
79 Sec Step-Saver; 939 F.2d at 108.
80 The court noted that the parties did not contest the application of Article 2 to their
dispute. See id. at 94 n.6. The court did offer a supporting citation to Advent Systems Ltd. v.
Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670,674-76 (3d Cir. 1991), in which the court thoughtfully analyzed
whether Article 2 applies to transactions in computer software. The Step-Saver court's will-
ingness to accept the application of Article 2 was based in part on the underlying policy of
the UCC to promote the expansion of commercial practices, and in part on the premise
that computer software is necessarily embodied in tangible media, or goods.
81 Section 2-207 of the UCC sets out a statutory alternative to the common law "battle
of the forms," Under this section. a binding contract may be found notwithstanding
conflict between forms exchanged between buyer and seller. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2001). Terms
that do not match may be included in the parties' agreement so long as they do not
conflict with the parties' commercially reasonable expectations or if they are separately
assented to. Id.
e2 Step-Saver; 939 F.2d at 103.
83 Id. at 96-97.
84 Id. at 105-06. Two post-Step-Saver courts also refused to enforce boxtop agreements,
although on different grounds. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255,258—
59 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding enforceability of shrinkwrap agreement preempted under fed-
eral copyright law); Ariz. Retail Sys. v. The Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Stipp. 759,764 (D.
Ariz. 1993) (license terms excluded from the parties' agreement I under section 2-209 of
the UCC). Arizona Retail Systems did allow for the possibility that under section 2-207, if the
software developer's "offer" consisted of delivery of sh•inkmapped software to the user,
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Both the court's use of Article 2 and its focus on the assent issue
sowed the seeds of later problems. Application of Article 2 was not
contested by the parties or analyzed by the court. Rather than clos-
ing the door on the question of shrinkwrap enforcement, Step-Saver in
effect offered an invitation, within the contract-as-assent model, that
later information proprietors and courts were happy to accept.
Largely because the Third Circuit applied Article 2 to this computer
software transaction, Article 2 has become the de facto legal standard
governing cases not only of defective software, but also of software
licensing gen erally. 86
2. ProCD, Inc. v. ZeidenbeT
Starting from the same Article 2 premise, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidcnberg
dramatically altered the landscape roughed out by Step-Saver; in effect
reversing what had appeared to be a presumption against shrinkwrap
enforceability and installing in its place a presumption favoring the
validity of shrinkwrap and click-through agreements and their cog-
opening the shrinkwrapped package could amount to -acceptance" of the license within.
See also U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Stipp. 2d 1201, 1206 (D. Kan. 1998), affd per
curiam, 185 F.3d 885 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (relying on Step-Saver to invalidate -single use" notice
restriction affixed to label for patented surgical instruments purchased by defendant).
85 Step-Saver; 939 F.2d at 95 n.6. Computer software is not a ''good" as that term histori-
cally has been used in commercial law. There are good reasons to conclude that commer-
cial practice involving transfers of software did not then and does not now recognize a
computer program as the commercial equivalent of a widget. This, of course, is one of the
leading arguments behind development and adoption of UCITA. Sec supra note 54; see also
I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Ser.% Level Corp., 183 F. Stipp. 2c1 328, 332 (D. Mass. 2002)
(noting -void" in commercial law regarding regulation of software transactions); Mary Jo
Dively, The Use of Standard Form Contracts in the Information Industry, in UNDERSTANDING
ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING: THE IMPACT OF REGULATIONS, NEW LAWS & NEW AGREE-
MENTS, at 573, 582-90 (PLI Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, and Literary Property
Course, Handbook Series No. 697, 2002) (providing a practitioner's view of the need for
UCITA). Article 2 was specifically designed to make the process of forming an agreement
less subject to common-law formalities, and less subject to hijacking by a party that ma-
nipulated the sending and receipt of purchase forms in such a way as to effectively impose
its terms on the other party. In practice. shrinkwrap and click-through agreements are
alleged to have precisely that effect. See Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-
Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46 NVAINE L. REV. 1805, 1806-08 (2000).
86 Sec Diana G. Richard & Michael K. Murphy, Frequently Litigated Computer Software Con-
tract Clauses: Contract Drafting Advice for the Computer Lawyer, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
LITIGATION, REPRESENTING YOUR CLIENT IN SOFTWARE PERFORMANCE & SYSTEM FAILURE
CLAIMS, at 33, 62-64 (PLI Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, and Literary Property Course,
Handbook Series No. 700, 2002). See generally Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to
Software Transactions, 38 Duq. L. REV. 459 (2000); Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply!, 35 EMORY L.J. 853 (1986).
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nates. 87 Judge Easterbrook's opinion in ProCD addressed precisely the
question left. open by Step-Savo; the effect. of the purchaser's (or licen-
see's) conduct in the face of notice, on the product itself, that such
conduct constituted acceptance of a license or other agreement. 88
Matthew Zeidenberg purchased three packages of ProCD's Se-
lectPhone database and search engine, distributed on CD-ROM discs
and packaged with a license agreement that prohibited purchasers of .
the discs from distributing their contents and from making them
available in any networked environmen0 The outside of the packag-
ing included a small notice that an agreement was included within,
but the package did not otherwise include its terms. 80 The terms were
spelled out in the user guide that accompanied the discs and were
referred to on fields on the computer screen when the user used the
SelectPhone CD-ROMs. 81 When ProCD sued Zeidenberg for breach
of the license agreement (Zeidenberg having uploaded the contents
of the SelectPhone database to an Internet site), Zeidenberg argued
that he was not bound by those terms. 92 Reviewing the claim under
three different sections of Article 2 of the UCC—sections 2-206, 2-
207, and 2-209—the district court held that whatever agreement Zei-
denberg and ProCD had entered into did not include the terms of
the license."
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that ProCD was entitled to prevail on its contract claim.94 Its reso-
lution of the shrinkwrap issue in favor of enforceability was unequivo-
cal, although the specifics of its rationale are hazy. 95 As in Step-Savo;
the court in ProCD assumed that Article 2 of the UCC governed the
87 See ProCD, Inc., v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996); Step-Sam; 939
F.2d at 105-06. From a common-law perspective, the case has had an impact that is dra-
matically out of step with the actual holding of the court. The parties in PmCD were before
the court under diversity jurisdiction, and the court actually ruled that a Wisconsin court,
were it to decide the case, would enforce the agreement in question under Wisconsin's
version of Article 2 of the UCC. 86 F.3d at 1453. No Wisconsin court had decided a
shrinkwrap case at the time that PmCD was decided, and no Wisconsin court has decided
such a case, even today.
88 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450-51.




83 See ProCD. Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Stipp. 640, 651-55 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
"ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
95 See id. at 1455.
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transaction . 96 Because in this merchant/consumer transaction 'here
was no battle-of-forms to contend with, the court relied on section 2-
204 of the UCC, an all-purpose contract formation section that, by de-
sign, discards traditional, formal common-law standards for contract
formation.97 Thus unencumbered by common-law notions of "offer"
and "acceptance," the court nonetheless proceeded to analyze the
transaction using a formal, common-law-style contract-as-assent
model, though without the sensitivity to context that typically charac-
terizes common-law analysis," The court focused in part on the
shrinkwrap transaction, in that the product package included a small
notice referring to license terms inside the package. 99 The terms of
Zeidenberg's purchase therefore provided at least constructive
knowledge of the existence of additional terms, and acceptance of
those terms, at the time that he bought the software.'" In part, the
court also focused on the click-through dimension of the transaction,
asserting that Zeidenberg's assent to ProCD's license terms occurred
when he actually used the software and accessed SelectPhone data.'"
The court did not carefully distinguish between the two interpreta-
t ions.to2
96 See id. at 1452-53.
97 Id. at 1452. The relevant text of section 2-204 provides: "A contract for the sale of
goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by
both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract." § 2-204(1) (2001).
98 See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53.
99 Sec id. at 1450-51.
100 See id. at 1452.
101 See id. at 1450. The exterior of the package Zeidenberg purchased informed pur-
chasers of the existence of a license agreement inside. Id. The printed license agreement
inside informed purchasers that using the computer program and the data constituted
acceptance of the restrictions on use stated in the printed materials and on the computer
screen. Id. It is not clear, therefore, whether the offer/acceptance sequence took place at
the point-of-sale, or at the point-of-computer-mouse, or both.
102 See id. at 1450-51. The Seventh Circuit extended the analysis in ProCD to non-
electronic agreements for sales of goods in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.34 1147, 1148-
50 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding customers bound by agreement with computer manufacturer
where notice inside box asserted that terms would be deemed accepted if the computer
were not returned within thirty days), in a manner that suggests that the ProC,D decision
was grounded primarily on Zeidenberg's purchase of the product with knowledge that
additional contract terms were forthcoming. Sec also I.Lan Sys., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (il-
lustrating same rationale, applied to a limitation of liability clause in click-through license
of software sold pursuant to value added reseller agreement). Other courts interpreting
ProCD have taken special notice of the court's statement that. Zeidenberg could not use the
SelectPhone software without specifically assenting to the license when it appeared on his
screen. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450; Specht t Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F.
Stipp, 2d 585, 592 (S.D.N.1: 2001), affd, 306 F.3d 17 (24 Cir. 2002).
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As an application of the commerce-promoting policies of the
UCC, ProCD appears uncontroversial, particularly if the case is under-
stood as depending on Zeidenberg's actual advance knowledge of re-
strictions that accompanied his purchase of an actual box containing
SelectPhone CD-ROMs.'" Given the court's reliance on a formal con-
tract-as-assent metaphor, as information access policy the case has
more disturbing implications.'" Whatever the merits of Article 2's re-
laxed approach to contract formation issues, the notion of assent
(even in the context of doctrines of "material alteration" under sec-
tion 2-207) has little resonance in an information environment where
consumers have little or no background expectations against which to
measure their "assent" experience.'" Worse, there is little reason to
think that the case should be read restrictively as based on Zeiden-
berg's actual notice of ProCD's terms. With respect to entirely elec-
tronic transactions, ProCD, or its Seventh Circuit progeny, have been
cited repeatedly by other courts as authority for the propositions that
choice of forum, limitation of remedy, and contractual restrictions on
access and reuse are enforceable so long as the user undertakes some
conscious act that can be deemed to ratify terms supplied by the pro-
prietor, even if the user's knowledge of the terms collies after the act
of ratification. 106 It is contract-as-assent, writ large.
103 See Robert A. H illman Be Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Eke-
ironic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 487-88 (2002) (noting consistency of ProCD with Article
2's "blanket assent" presumption, coupled with the doctrine of reasonable expectations).
Even on this assumption, as a matter of contract law the case is not unproblematic, Zei-
den berg himself may well have known of the license restriction, but it is far from clear that
a typical or reasonable acquirer of the SelectPhone product, or of an equivalent electronic
information product, would be equally cognizant of the license "offer." Also, as a matter of
copyright law, the court's summary rejection of the argument that restrictions on Zeiden-
berg's reuse of the telephone number data were preempted by federal law remains contro-
versial. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing
En Banc at 8-9, Bowers v. Baystate Techns., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317(Fed. Cir. 2003), available at
http://juristlaw.pitt.edu/amicus/bowers_v_baystate_rehearing.pdf.
1 " See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53.
105 See Madison, SFIPM note 56, at 1055-58.
t08
	 e.g., Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1324-25; Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, 216 F. Stipp. 2d
1071, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (acceptance of printed terms analyzed under ProCD); Adobe
Sys., 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1051; Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104-05 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) (acceptance of printed terms analyzed under ProCD and Hill); 1-A Equip. Co. v.
ICode, Inc., 43 U.C.C. Rep, Serv. 2d (CRC) 807, No. 00570/467, 2000 WL 33281687, at
*2-3 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 2000), appeal dismissed, 2003 Mass. App. Div. 30; O'Quin v. Verizon
Wireless, No. C1V.A.01-855-D, 2003 WL 1889293, at *4-5 (M.D. La. Feb. 7, 2003); Regis-
tencom, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 245-46; Scott v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 726 N.YS.2d 60, 64 (App.
Div. 2001), aff'd as modified by Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of MY., 774 N.E.2d 1190 (N.Y.
2002); Madison. supra note 56, at 1053. Where access to information is not involved,
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3. Spec& v. Netscape Communications Coip. 107
With the ebbing of the dot.com economy, the high tide of click-
through enforceability represented by ProCD may dissipate somewhat
as well.'" Yet contract-as-assent remains the dominant metaphor.m 9 In
Specht v Netscape Communications anp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit declined to enforce a click-through agreement
offered on the Internet in connection with downloading a computer
program. 110 The court's analysis leaves ample room for enforcement
equivalent arguments have not been accepted uniformly. Compare Boomer v. AT&T Corp.,
309 F.3d 404, 415 (7th Cu. 2002) (enforcing arbitration clause in customer service agree-
ment with long distance carrier, given use of services after mailed notice of offer, citing
Hill), Cook's Pest Control, Inc. v. Rebar, No. 1010897, 2002 WL 31780946, at *5 (Ala. Dec,
13, 2002) (enforcing terms of disclaimer of arbitration agreement proposed by company,
where customer returned service contract with payment and addendum proposing
modified terms, and company accepted by negotiating check and continuing service), and
Southtrust Bank v. Williams, 775 So. 2c1 184, 190-91 (Ala. 2000) (enforcing notice of
change to arbitration agreement regarding bank account), with Mattingly v. Hughes Elec.
Corp., 810 A.2d 498, 505-09 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (finding arbitration clause alleg-
edly barring class action by satellite TV subscriber invalid despite alleged "constructive
acceptance' by customer's continued use of service after receipt of modified terms in the
mail, distinguishing ProCD and Hill), and Sadie v. Bank of Mn., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 291
(Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to enforce notice of change unilaterally unposed by bank, de-
spite customer's prior assent to form agreement permitting bank to change terms).
1 ° 7 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). The district court opinion, which used slightly different
reasoning, is reported in 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y 2001).
308 See Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Stipp. 2d 1165, 1175, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (declin-
ing to enforce click-through agreement to arbitrate on grounds of both procedural and
substantive unconscionability); Adobe Sys., 171 F. Stipp. al at 1080, 1083, 1087, 1093 (C.D.
Cal. 2001) (refusing to enforce software "license" where reseller of software argued that
plaintiff's claims were limited tinder first sale doctrine, and where reseller never installed
software and therefore never assented to click-through license barring unauthorized ac-
cess).
1 °9 Sec B01003, 320 F.3d at 1323-25 (assuming but not deciding that a shrinkwrap
agreement is enforceable as a matter of contract law); Dejohn v. The .TV Corp. 1nel, 245 F.
Stipp. 2d 913, 915-17 (N.D. III. 2003) (enforcing forum selection clause where customer
was required to click on box indicating assent); Adobe Sys., 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 (con-
cluding that software developer can enforce shrinkwrap agreement's characterization of
transaction with customer as "license" rather than "sale"); Hughes v. McMenamon, 204 F.
Stipp. 2d 178, 181 (D. Mass. 2002) (enforcing forum selection clause in America Online
Terms of Service Contract where subscriber clicked on terms when he became subscriber);
LLan Sys., 183 F. Stipp. 2d at 338-39 (enforcing click-through license under authority of
Article 2 and ProCD, where defendant had previously installed plaintiff's software and
therefore had reason to expect existence of license); Forrest v. Verizon Communications,
Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010, 1015 (D.C. 2002) (enforcing click-through forum selection
clause); Moore v. Microsoft Corp„ 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (App. Div. 2002) (enforcing click-
through agreement under ProCD on the ground that the consumer downloaded the soft-
ware and used it with knowledge of the existence of a license).
uo 306 E3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002).
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of more carefully crafted agreements, but its approach suggests some
increasing recognition of user interests in contract formation, even
tinder the prevailing contract-as-assent paradigm."
The plaintiffs in Specht raised substantive claims under the federal
Electronic Coinniunications Privacy Act and the CFAA in connection
with alleged surveillance of their activities, as users, while using Net-
scape's SmartDownload software on the Internet. 112 Netscape argued
that a license that accompanied the SmartDownload product con-
tained an enforceable agreement to arbitrate all disputes.'" Netscape
moved to stay the federal court proceedings in favor of private arbitra-
tion.' 14
The district court denied Netscape's motion, and the Second
Circuit affirmed, concluding that the plaintiffs had not given their
assent to the license agreement offered by Netscape.n 5 In so doing,
the Second Circuit was careful to tie its ruling to the manner in which
Netscape's alleged contract offer was presented to Internet users." 6
SmartDownload was, for most of the plaintiffs, a product available for
download for free from Netscape's Web site. 117 Users were able to
download the program from Netscape's site simply by clicking on a
"Download" icon. 118 At the bottom of that download page, Netscape
had included text inviting, but not requiring, users downloading the
software to review a licensing agreement before downloading and us-
ing the software." 9 The agreement itself was not available on the
download page but was instead accessible only through a series of hy-
perlinks. 120 The court found that it could not be reasonably con-
chided that those who downloaded Netscape's program could be
deemed to have manifested assent to the proposed terms, because it
could not be concluded that those users had actual or constructive
notice of those ternis. 121
in Sec id. at 21-25,
112 Id. at 21.
113 Id. at 21-22.
114 Id. at 20.
116
 SPeCht, 306 F.3d at 20-21.
116 See id. at 20.
117 Id. One plaintiff apparently downloaded the program from a shareware site. This
fact did not change the court's conclusion. Id. at 24.
118 Id. at 22,
119 Id. at 23-24.
126 See Specht, 306 F.3d at 29-30. The first hyperlink took the user to an index of hyper-
linked license agreements; the user was then expected to select the appropriate license
agreement and to read its text, via a second hyperlink.
121 See id. at 28-30.
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The Second Circuit relied on both common law and UCC Article
2 "assent" principles to analyze the question of contract formation. 122
The court concluded that the act of downloading the software did not
unambiguously manifest assent to Netscape's license terms. 125 Largely
because of the location and format of the notice of proposed terms,
the user was not made aware that downloading the software was an act
of any significance with respect to any contract. 124 "A consumer's
clicking on a download button does not communicate assent to con-
tractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that
clicking on the download button would signify assent to those
terms."125 "Plaintiffs were responding to an offer that did not carry an
immediately visible notice of the existence of license terms or require
unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms. Thus, plaintiffs'
'apparent manifestation of ... consent' was to terms 'contained in a
document whose contractual nature [was] not obvious." 120 The court
distinguished this case from situations (such as those used by Net-
scape for other computer programs available on the Internet) in
which the user was required to click on an "accept" or "acknowledge"
icon before being permitted to access the relevant data, service, or
program. 127
4. Click-Through Agreements, Context, and Places on the Net
As a practical matter, Specht seems clearly preferable to ProCD
from the standpoint of the consumer, whether goods or information
is involved. 128 The Article 2-based evolution of shrinkwrap law for ac-
cess control collies at a fairly steep price, however coherent doctri-
nally the evolution may be. The initial rationale for applying Article 2
to these cases was that computer programs were delivered via media
(and in packages) that were essentially akin to goods, even if they
were not "classic" goods. 129 Applying the framework of Article 2 there-
fore made sense. There were merchants. They were treating copies of
computer programs essentially as they would have treated equivalent
122 See id.
12/ Id. at 30.
124 Id. at 29-30.
125 Specks, 306 F.3d at 29-30.
126 Id. at 31 (quoting Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins 3i Aikman Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr. 347,
351 (Ct. App. 1972)). The case was decided under California law.
127 Sec id. at 31-32.
1 '28 See Specht, 306 F.3d at 17; ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1447.
129 Sec Speeht, 306 F.3d at 28; ProCD, 86 F.3d al 1452.
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widgets. 13° There was the "battle of the forms" that Article 2 largely
eradicated, because Article 2 embodied the notion that common-law
formalities could be discarded in the face of virtually universal and
widely understood everyday practices and expectations.I 31 There was,
in sum, a coherent commercial context in which application of Article
2 could be justified, and in which, in principle, assent was assumed
(via context) as often as it actually was proved.' 32
If Specht fairly represents the present equilibrium in click-through
law,'" the formal contract-as-assent metaphor may not be enough to
'm) See Specht, 306 F.3d at 28; ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
Sec U.C.C. Art. 2 (2001); Rodan, supra note 86, at 857-58.
132 See generally Rodau, supra note 86, at 864-910, for an argument justifying applica-
tion of Article 2 to software licenses on essentially these grounds.
138 But see supra note 109 and cases cited therein. For present purposes. 1 take the most
optimistic view of Specht, which is that the case is not only well-reasoned but strongly sug-
gestive of the likely evolution of commercial doctrine. See also Kunz et al., supra note 7, at
306. 411-15, The authors describe the recommendations of a working group on electronic
commerce sponsored by the American Bar Association. The working group, taking Specht
as the most recent case on point, offered recommendations for drafting enforceable click-
through agreements. The cases relied on by the working group are: America Online. Inc. v.
Booker; 781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); America Online, Inc. u Superior Court, 108
Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Ct. App. 2001); Caspi v. Microsoft Network L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (NJ. Su-
per, Ct. App. Div. 1999); Celmins v. America Online, Inc., 748 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1999); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Groff v. America On-
line, Inc., No. PC 97-0331, 1998 WI, 307001 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 27, 1998); Hotmail Corp. v.
VanS Money Pie, Inc., No. C-98 JW PVTENE, C 98-20064. 1998 111 388389, 47 U.S.P,Q.2d
(BNA) 1020 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16; 1998); Lieschke u RealNetworhs, Inc., No. 99 C7294, 99 C
7380, 2000 111 198424 (N.D. III. Feb. 11, 2000); Pollstar v. Gigamania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d
974 (E.D. Cal. 2000); In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. M. May
8, 2000); Rudder v. Microsoft Corp., 2 C.P.R. (4th) 474, No. 97-CT-046534CP, 1999 Carswel-
lOnt 3195 (Westlaw) (Ont. Super. Ct. Justice Oct. 8, 1999); Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d 585;
Scott, 726 N.1:S. 2d 60; Tickelmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com , No. CV 99-7654, 2000 WI.. 525390.
U.S.P.Q.2c1 (BNA) 1344 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000); Williams v. America Online, Inc., No. 00-
0962. 2001 WL. 135825, 43 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1101 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 8,
2001). Ktinz et al., supra note 7, at 425. The Article does not include ProCD itself, although
that case was decided only a month before CompuServe. It omits cases that address the en-
forceability of shrinkwrap licenses. Sec Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchron-
ies, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519, 528-30 (W.D. Pa. 2000), affil, 234 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 2000);
Mgmt, Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry COMM, Inc., 743 So. 2d 627, 631-32 (Fla.
App. 1999) (upholding shrinkwrap license); M.A. Mortenson Co., v. Timberline Software
Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 314 (Wash. 2000) (same). Also omitted are the so-called "Gateway
cases," in which courts address the validity of assent obtained via a customer's keeping a
computer shipped by mail beyond a number of days designated by the seller. See Hill, 105
F.3d at 1149-50 (finding assent); Klocek v. Gateway. Inc., 104 F. Stipp. 2d 1332, 1139-42
(D. Kan. 2000) (finding no assent); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL
307369, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1110 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2000), affil, 763 A.2d 92
(Del. 2000) (finding assent); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571-72 (App.
Div. 1998) (same); Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 NNS.2c1 389, 391-93 (Cie. Ct. 2001)
(finding no assent). A number of other courts have addressed the legal effects of standard
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sustain it."4
 The context described in the last paragraph no longer
exists with respect to many, if not most, of the circumstances in which
click-through and related agreements, and particularly access-limiting
provisions, are intended to. be enforced." 5 Although courts are start-
ing to realize that mutual assent may actually mean something more
than "typical user expectations," it is equally clear that neither user
assent nor those expectations have any consistent meaning on which
courts, or the parties before them, may rely.'" Courts may increas-
form notices in the computer software and/or Internet context. See, e.g., Green v. Am.
Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding AOL immune from snit for
defamation based on content posted by third party; ruling based in part on terms of AOL
Member Agreement between AOL and plaintiff); Kilgallen v. Network Solutions, Inc., 99 F.
Stipp. 2d 125, 128-29 (D. Mass. 2000) (enforcing terms in electronic notice of Web site
registration); Am. Eyewear, Inc. V. Peeper's Sunglasses & Accessories, Inc., 106 F. Stipp. 2d
895, 900-01 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (noting that defendant could have avoided finding of per-
sonal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts by using click-through agreement on Web
site); Kaczmarek v. Microsoft Corp., 39 F. Stipp. 2d 974, 977-78 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (finding
claim for breach of warranty barred by warranty contained in software manual that be-
came enforceable when user retained software for specified period of time); Green Book
Int'l Corp. v. Inunity Corp., 2 F. Sapp. 2d 112, 115 (D, Mass 1998) (noting general accep-
tance of shrinkwrap agreements); Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F.
Stipp. 2d 782, 790-91 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (interpreting use limitations in shareware license to
restrict fair use of program); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Cu .., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218,
1228-31 (D. Utah 1997) (refusing to enforce shrinkwrap license because of conflict with
first sale doctrine in copyright law), vacated in part on other grounds, 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah
1999); Microstar v. Formgen, Inc., 942 F. Stipp. 1312, 1317-18 (S.D. Cal. 1996), affd in
part. mid in part, 153 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) (relying on shareware license in part to
limit scope of users' rights to create new versions of computer game).
tit From this point, some contracts scholars conclude that the Article 2 framework re-
mains essentially viable. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 103, at 475-86 (arguing that
existing Article 2 assent framework provides sufficient structure to regulate electronic
transactions); James I White, Autistic Contracts, 45 WAYNE L. REv. 1693, 1721-31 (2000)
(endorsing "reasonable opportunity to review" standard for enforcement of electronic
form agreements).
135 It is implicit in the discussion above and in application of the assent paradigm that
click-through law does not distinguish between access to and use of information delivered
on physical media, on the one hand, and access to and use of information delivered en-
tirely electronically, on the other. It does not distinguish between agreements among mer-
chants and agreements involving a merchant and a consumer. It does not distinguish be-
tween terms regulating remedy and terms regulating access and use. Legally speaking,
shrinkwrap is to be analyzed like click-through is to be analyzed like "browse-wrap." Soft-
ware producers recognized early on that the tangible-goods based Article 2 model would
not last long. The project to draft what became proposed Article 2B of the UCC, now sub-
stantially revised and proposed as the UCITA, began in 1992. See J.H. Reichman & Jona-
than A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract
with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA, L. REv. 875, 880 (1999) (critiquing proposed
Article 2B while sympathetic to interest in abandoning the mutual assent model); see also
supra note 54.
136 See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 135, at 933-36.
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ingly require that information proprietors show that information us-
ers actually knew what they were doing. With respect to access regula-
tion in the abstract, information users frequently do not know what,
they are doing. Contract-as-assent is a fiction in the electronic envi-
ronment, even when it favors consumers.t 37
Information proprietors are searching for more durable alterna-
tives.'" Before the evolution of the commercial Internet, few alterna-
tives were available. Information proprietors tried revisions to copy-
right law, and refinements of commercial law, and sometimes both at
once. 139 The Internet also allows for framing the issues accounted for
by click-through law in a different way, one based on an Internet-as-
place metaphor that is far more intuitively comfortable to most Inter-
net users than contract-as-assent. Courts have been increasingly recep-
tive to information proprietors' arguments. Literally, the law, along
with the Internet, has taken "shape." Decontextualized assent has
been recontextualized as access to places on the Net.. "Access to in-
117
 Witness the ongoing pitched battle over adoption of UCITA, heavily supported by
software developers and opposed by a coalition of consumer groups and (increasingly)
corporate and institutional software users. Compare UCITA Yes, at http://www.ucitayes.org
(last visited Jan. 11, 2003) (pro-UCITA coalition of technology companies called the Digi-
tal Commerce Coalition), with AFFECT, at http://www.4cite.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2002)
(anti-UCITA coalition named Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions). An
example of the confusing intersection between consumer protection regulation and as-
sent-oriented click-through law is provided by the recent decision in State ex rd. Stovall v.
Drill Entesprises. Inc., 62 P.M 653 (Kan, 2003). The State of Kansas sued an online phar-
macy for dispensing controlled substances over the Internet in unconscionable fashion, in
violation of the state's consumer protection statute. Id. at 654.. In support of its nncon-
scionability argument, the state focused on the waiver of liability to which buyers were
required to "agree" before purchasing. Id. at 656, 659. The court ruled that the defen-
dants' practices were not unconscionable, because the waiver (which the court implicitly
accepted as enforceable) concerned a waiver of liability, not of implied warranties of
fitness of merchantability. and the products that the buyers (agents for the state, investigat-
ing the case) received were not defective. Id. at 659-61. The buyers, in short, received pre-
cisely what they agreed to receive (limitation of liability included). even though at the time
they were required to waive their rights, they could not have known whether that would he
so.
1315 See infra mite 139 and accompanying text.
130 Article 2B, now UCITA, being the proposed revision of commercial law. See sepia
note 54. PromotiOn of an extreme view of computing technology that holds that all com-
puter activity involves making numerous "copies" of copyrighted works, each of which has
to be authorized by the copyright owner, being the most notorious example of (successful)
revision of copyright law. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Exp. Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335
(9th Cir. 1995); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-18 (9th Ci•.
1993). Digital rights management, technology that permits information proprietors to
implement fine-grained access contract via software, was developed to bridge the two per-
spectives. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use it Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management
on Copyright's Fair Use Dochine, 76 N.C. L, KIN. 557, 564-67 (1998).
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formation" (the key issue in click-through agreements) has become
"access to the information proprietor's physical resources." Contract,
where mutual assent is necessary, becomes property, where the
owner's right to exclude is presumed. The following three Parts ex-
plain how the metaphors have been manifested in both common-law
and statutory form, via application to commercial problems of diverse
but specifically noncommercial legal doctrines.
B. Trespass to Chattels
The most blunt of these developments has been the adaptation
to the Internet of the ancient doctrine of trespass to chattels,"°
defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as intentionally "using or
intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another," or "dispos-
sessing another of the chattel." 141 In the electronic information con-
text, the core concept behind the law of trespass is unauthorized use
of a computer system connected to a computer network, 142 In the
electronic network environment, the concept was used initially to pre-
vent unwanted information from being delivered to the network, a
goal that has little to do with traditional notions of regulation of
commercial activity between buyers and sellers, or among compeii-
tors. 143 More recently, and as adapted for commercial purposes, tres-
14° See generally I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Websites, 1996 .
 . ON-
LINE L. art. 7 (Oct. 6), at htip://wwwwm.eduilaw/publications/jo1/95_96/hardy.html.
141
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 217 (1965). Also, in section 265, the Restate-
ment provides: "Otte who uses a chattel with the consent of another is subject to liability in
trespass for any harm to the chattel which is caused by or occurs in the course of any use
exceeding the consent, even though such use is not a conversion." The Comments to sec-
tion 217 'tote both the significance of the requirement that the trespass be intentional and
the character of the conduct that, in this context, may be deemed to be intentional:
The intention required to make an actor liable for trespass to a chattel is simi-
lar to that necessary to make one liable for an invasion of another's interest in
bodily security, in freedom from an offensive contact, or confinement....
Such an intention is present when an act is done for the purpose of using or
otherwise intermeddling with a chattel or with knowledge that such an in-
termeddling will, to a substantial certainty, result from the act. It is not neces-
sary that the actor should know or have reason to know that such intermed-
dling is a violation of the possessory rights of another.
Id. § 217 cmt. c.
' 42 See Hardy, supra note 140. 11 1-6.
143 Given the potential scope of trespass to chattels as a theory of protecting electronic
information, it is noteworthy that recent interest in the doctrine arose primarily to protect
computers from invasion by unwanted signals (and/or unvmnted content) from the out-
side. Courts, commentators, and legislatures have wrestled at length with economic, tem-
poral, and psychic damage caused to Internet service providers and their customers by
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pass to chattels is deployed to prevent unauthorized access to infor-
mation already present on the network." 4 Several recent courts have
awarded injunctive relief to plaintiffs on a theory that electronically
accessing the plaintiff's computer network and/or servers, to obtain
information without the plaintiff's consent, was unlawful. 145
For example, in cBay, Inc. v. Bidders' Edge, Inc., the auction Web
site eBay sued an auction aggregator named Bidders' Edge, to obtain
an injunction forbidding Bidders' Edge from electronically "crawling"
the eBay site with automated computer querying programs, or robots,
to obtain auction information, without eBay's permission.'" eBay ar-
gued that it had put. Bidders' Edge on notice that its access was unau-
thorized, both via express (traditional) communication and via eBay's
attempts to block the Bidders' Edge program electronically. 117 Accept-
ing eBay's claim that it had suffered a trespass to chattels, the district
court entered the requested injunction despite observing that the
harm alleged, if any existed, was speculative and depended solely on
the potential for harm if the injunction were denied.ns Mere un-
wanted "use" of the plaintiffs computer, in the form of unwanted ac-
mass mailings of unsolicited commercial electronic mail, or ".spain," Trespass ideas were
initially invoked to prevent these unwanted signals from "encroaching." as it were, on the
computer systems of Internet service providers ("ISPs") and on the mailboxes of harassed
users. See Am, Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Stipp. 24 1255. 1277
(N.D. Iowa 2000); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Stipp. 24 444, 452 (E.D. Va. 1998);
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Stipp. 1015, 1020-27 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
141 See. e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidders' Edge. Inc., 100 F. Stipp. 2d 1058, 1068-72 (N.D. Cal.
2000); Intel Corp. v. Hanna 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244. 247-52 (Ct. App. 2001), 'nano granted,
43 P.3d 587 (Cal. 2002); Registencom, 126 F. Stipp. 24 at 238. 249-51.
115 See, e.g., clay, 100 F. Stipp. 2d at 1068-74; Intel, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247-52; Regis-
tencom, 126 F. Stipp. 24 at 238, 249-51.
146 100 F. Stipp. 2d at 1062-63.
"7 Id. at 1068. eBay posted an electronic notice on its source code of its Web pages in
the format known as the "robot exclusion header," a sort of electronic notice detectable to
robot programs (and to anyone else examining the source code of the pages), which re-
quested, but did not mandate. that robots observe a "stay away" request. Id. at 1061, More
formally, the Standard for Robots Exclusion is a technical standard that permits Web page
programmers to provide a notice, in the source code of each page. stating that the page
should or should not be open for indexing and searching by automated software pro-
grams, such as those used by search engines to compile their databases. Robots pro-
grammed to comply with the Standard will observe the notice and not search or index
pages with header information; robots not so programmed will ignore the notice. Informa-
tion about the Standard for Robots Exclusion is available at http://www.robotstxt.org  (last
visited Nov. 15, 2002).
145 clay, 100 F. Supp. 24 at 1070-72. The clay court cited two similar cases, but neither
of those courts had based a finding of liability solely on the possibility of future harm. See
CompuServe. 962 F. Supp. at 1015. 1022; Thrifty-Tel v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 475
(Ct. App. 1996).
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cess to the information available at eBay's Web site, was sufficient, in
other words, to justify the injunction.' 49
Register.com, Inc. v. Vetia, Inc. involved a claim for trespass to chat-
tels, among other theories, by Register.com , an Internet domain
name registrar, against an Internet service provider that electronically
"crawled" the plaintiffs online WHOIS database of domain name reg-
istration information, using what the court referred to as a "search
robot."'" Verio was using e-mail, telephone, and address information
about domain name registrants to solicit prospective customers of
Verio's Web hosting business, as prohibited by a notice posted on the
Register.com Web site and in competition with Register.com . 151
 The
district court granted the requested injunction, citing the eBay deci-
sion, on the ground that the defendant, had, by posting the Terms of
Use provision on its Web site and by bringing the lawsuit itself,
sufficiently indicated its intention that the defendant (and others us-
ing equivalent technology) were not welcome to "crawl" the plaintiff's
system. 152 Noting that the plaintiffs argument for damages was weak
to nonexistent, the court nonetheless found harm sufficient to justify
a trespass-to-chattels claim, based on the risk of future interruption to
the defendant's computer system.'"
Most recently, an intermediate appellate court in California
affirmed a grant of a permanent injunction on a trespass-to-chattels
theory. 154 In Intel corp. v. Hatnidi, Intel sought to enjoin the defen-
dant, a disgruntled former employee of the company, from sending
unsolicited e-mail to current Intel employees. 155 The trial court issued
the injunction and the appellate court affirmed, on the ground that
Hamidi's e-mail messages traversed Intel's computer system without
119 See eBay, 100 F. Stipp. 2d at 1070-71; sec also Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Process-
ing, Inc., No. C-00-0724JCS, 2001 WI, 1736382, at *11-13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001) (refus-
ing to grant summary judgment against claim of trespass to chattels because plaintiff
sufficiently presented evidence of unpermitted use of its computer system by defendant's
robot program).
15° 126 F. Stipp. 2d at 241-43.
151 Id. at 243-44.
162 See id. at 249. The court described a notice posted to the plaintiffs Web site regard-
ing appropriate terms of use as significant to its reasoning, but it noted that the defen-
dant's robotic searching did not violate any of the terms of the notice. See id. No breach of
contract claim was possible, and the defendant's lack of authority to search the database
was primarily inferred from the fact of the plaintiff's lawsuit itself. Sec id.
1" Id. at 250.
154 h, telt 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252.
155 /d. at 246.
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Intel's consent. 156 Intel was damaged by virtue of the accumulated dis-
traction suffered by employees who opened and then discarded the
messages. 157 According to the court, "Hamidi refused to respect Intel's
request to stop invading its internal, proprietary e-mail system by
sending unwanted e-mails to thousands of Intel's employees on the
system."''s As a result, "lntel proved more than its displeasure with
1-lamidi's message, it showed it was hurt by the loss of productivity
caused by the thousands of employees distracted from their work and
by the time its security department spent trying to halt the distrac-
tions."159
The Internet-as-place metaphor has not been solely responsible
for these developments, but it unquestionably provides significant as-
sistance to their doctrinal acceptance.m The argumentative value of
the metaphor is simple. To modern courts and commentators, a viola-
tion of property boundaries is a trespass. 131 The owner of a parcel of
real property has a nearly absolute power to exclude trespassers. 162
The owner of an electronic parcel of "real property" ought to have an
equivalent power. 163 The courts are seizing on what they perceive to
be the Internet's physical characteristics.'" Characterizing the Inter-
net as a place, or collection of places, reinforces the idea of bounda-
156 Id. at 247, 249-50.
157 Id. at 252.
iss
159 Intel, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250.
160 The most thoughtful analysis and critique of the trespass-to-chattel phenomenon,
written before the cases discussed in the text were decided, proposes a nuisance-based
formulation of access control (primarily in support of anti-span regulation). See Dan L.
Burk, The Trouble With Trespass, 4 j, SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 53-56 (2000); see also
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Competition on the Internet: lilro Owns Product and Pricing Information?,
53 VAND. 1.. REv. 1965, 2001-05 (2000) (also advocating nuisance-based balancing test
access control regime); Richard Warner, 'Border Disputes: Trespass to Chattels on the Internet, 47
Vim.. L. REv, 117, 157-59 (2002) (recommending reasonable person standard for implied
consent in trespass cases).
161 As opposed to its more nuanced common-law sense of "invasion of a protected
property interest."
162 Sec, e.g., eBay, 100 F, Stipp. 2(1 at 1066 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 176 (1979)).
163 Sec id,
164 Id. at 1067 (stating that if eBay's computer system "were a brick and mortar auction
house with limited seating capacity, eBay would be entitled to" reserve seats for bidders,
refuse entrance to non-bidders, and seek relief against trespassers).
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ries in a colloquial sense, and boundaries can be (but should not be)
transgressed. 165
It is obvious from this description that courts, at best, have mis-
used the Internet-as-place metaphor by confusing access to "places"
that represent information with access to the physical computer
hardware that underlies computer systems. There is a metaphorical
slipperiness here, a mixing of levels of abstraction, which courts seem
happy to indulge. eBay provides the best example of the phenome-
non. 166
 The "chattel" at issue was the physical hardware operated by
the plaintiff. 167
 The "intermeddling" with the chattel was the un-
wanted sending of electronic signals "onto" or "into" the chattel by
the defendant, an act that (even if repeated frequently) does no dam-
age to the chattel, even if it does consume "bandwidth" (the ability of
eBay servers to communicate with other networked computers—i.e.,
an intangible) and thereby does damage to eBay's bank account.ws
The defendant "wrongfully" accessed information that was valuable
not at the signal (electron, or bit) level, but only at the human-
readable level, prices being quoted for different items up for auction.
In other words, the wrongful access took place at the Web site level,
whereas the court indulged the plaintiff's theory of trespass to the
serveni 69
 The Internet-as-place metaphor bridged the logical gap be-
tween the actual harm (the former) and the legal harm (the latter).
165 The court un eBay specifically analogized eBay's claim to that of an owner of real
property, in determining that preliminary injunctive relief was an appropriate remedy. Sec
id.
166 At least until the California Supreme Court issues its opinion in Intel. Intel Corp. v.
Hamidi. 43 P.3d 587, 587 (Cal. 2002) (granting review of Intel. 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244).
eBay, 100 F. Stipp. 2d at 1063.
168 Id. at 1062. "eBay's claim is that [Bidders' Edge's] use is appropriating eBay's per-
sonal property by using valuable bandwidth and capacity, and necessarily compromising
eBay's ability to use that capacity for its own purposes." Id. at 1071. The chattel, the server
or collection of servers, is designed precisely to accommodate high volume, repeated
surges of electronic signals. As one of the few profitable electronic commerce ventures on
the Internet, eBay is perhaps uniquely aware of the need to maintain a large bank of ro-
bust computers. eBay's reaction to spiders on its servers evokes that of Captain Renault
the film Casablanca:
Renault: Everybody's to leave here immediately. This cafe is closed until fur-
ther notice. Clear the room at once.
Rick Blaine: How can you close use up? On what grounds?
Renault: I'm shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on Lls here.
Croupier: Your winnings, sir.
Renault: Oh. Thank you very much. Everybody out at once.
CASABLANCA (Warner Brothers 1942).
169 See eBay, 100 F. Stipp. 2d at 1070.
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The court's premise was a fair one. eBay claimed injury to its
business based on alleged unfair competition by Bidders' Edge.'" The
injury consisted of damage to a slippery intangible, the information
contained on eBay's Web site. To deal with that injury, the court fo-
cused on something easier to grasp, both literally and legally: eBay's
computer equipment. 171
 The court might legitimately have concluded
that Bidders' Edge exceeded permitted access to the computer if and
to the extent that the court intended to conclude, albeit indirectly,
that Bidders' Edge was competing unfairly with eBay. That route was
not the one that the court took; instead, the court focused on the
transgression of the electronic boundary as wrongful in itself.'" What
began as a technique of protecting computers from information de-
livered from the outside has become not only a technique for protect-
ing the information that the computers already contained, but a tool
for protecting that information regardless of the actual harm sus-
tained. What started as solicitude for injury suffered by proprietors of
computer networks has become a tool for enforcing the perceived
absolute right of the property owner to exclude unwanted visitors. As
in real property trespass cases, the "injury" derives not from actual
harm to the premises but from the proprietor's loss of the right to set
the terms and conditions of entry, 173
 Harm to informational interests
themselves is not relevant.
Reliance on the Internet-as-place metaphor facilitated this transi-
tion, by essentially abandoning two significant requirements of coin-
"2 1d. at 1063.
" I Id. at 1071.
"2 Id. at 1070-71.
' 73 See id. at 1073 (holding that Bidders' Edge's representatives are enjoined from
crawling eBay's Web site without written authorization). In the real property context, there
may be a good reason for connecting injury to an intangible interest (the right to exclude)
to injury to a tangible interest (theft of a tangible thing), if the letter of the law does not
support liability for the latter but injury to the former is clear. See People v. Kwok, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 40,48-49 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that defendant who made copy of key to vic-
tim's house was properly convicted of theft of property, within section 484 of the California
Penal Code, because victim was not permanently deprived of tangible property, but was
permanently deprived of exclusive control over access to her home). Retail stores occa-
sionally try to enforce nominal policies stating the right to exclude individuals who are
merely collecting comparative price information. See, e.g., Culhane v. State, 668 S.W.2d 24
(Ark. 1984) (applying criminal trespass statute to employee of discount competitor of
complainant Wal-Mart, who refused to leave store after being asked to do so); Mosher v.
Cook United, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 720 (Ohio 1980) (rejecting civil action by consumer against
store that had him arrested for trespassing). To the extent that these cases uphold anti-
competitive behavior regarding price information, their reasoning seems questionable. See
Desnick v, Am. Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345,1351 (7th Cir. 1995).
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mon-law trespass-to-chattels claims and thereby converting trespass to
chattels into the kind of strict liability regime that effectively charac-
terizes trespass to land. First, a trespass to chattel involves provable
harm to the chattel. 174 In the world of physical property, the require-
ment has the sensible function of assuring that the plaintiff has a legal
interest worth vindicating and can prove the extent of the harm,' and
also assuring that the defendant has a reasonable opportunity to avoid
causing the injury. 175 In the world of interests in information, the
property owner has two interests, one intangible and one tangible.
Thoughtful application of trespass law in the present context would
focus on the true nature of the plaintiff's injury, and on the counter-
part interest of the defendant in avoiding that injury. Yet none of the
courts discussed above give more than scant attention to requiring
proof of actual harm to the chattel itself, or to notice to the defendant
of the likelihood of that injury. 176 The Internet-as-place metaphor al-
lows courts to conflate intangible and tangible injury, and allows the
court to avoid a difficult inquiry into the character of the former.
Second, the doctrine clearly includes the requirement that the
trespass be intentional. 177 The Restatement formulation of the rule re-
quires proof of knowledge that "intermeddling" with the chattel will
likely result, or that the defendant's activity is intended to intermed-
dle or interfere with the use of the chattel itself. 178 From the Restate-
went it appears that mere notice that the plaintiff does not consent to
the intermeddling is not sufficient to demonstrate intent. 179 An alter-
native, less strict interpretation would treat the intent requirement as
it is treated in cases of trespass to land, as a means merely of distin-
174 See eBay, 100 F. Stipp. 2d at 1071.
175 See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 ant. e (1965)).
176 Courts' failure to analyze the question of harm in recent trespass-to-chattels cases
has been well-described elsewhere. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, What the Future Holds: Policy
Choices in the Global E-Marketplace, 7 Roc ER WiLLIAMS U.L. REV. 151, 160-61 (2001).
177 See, e.g., Zaslow Kroenert, 176 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1946); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
Towrs § 217 (1965).
178 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965); see also supra note 141 and ac-
companying text.
176 As the California Supreme Court said regarding the related tort of conversion. To
establish a conversion, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show an intention or purpose
to convert the goods and to exercise ownership over them, or to prevent the owner from
taking possession of his property." Zaslow, 176 P.2d at 7; see also ban° v. Colonial Yacht An-
chorage, 72 Cal. Rptr. 823, 827 (Ct. App. 1968), cited with approval in eBay, 100 F. Stipp. 2d
at 1070 (noting that trespass to personal property requires proof of both intent and lack of
consent). The court in Pritikin v. Liberation Publications, Inc. 83 F. Stipp. 2d 920. 923 (N.D.
Ill. 1999), discussed but did not decide whether the tort of conversion requires proof of a
type of intent that proof of copyright infringement does not.
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guishing claims for "intentional" or "knowing" harm from claims for
negligence. 18° None of the three cases discussed above acknowledge
intent, as a separate element of the claim, other than to note that the
plaintiff did not consent to the defendant's activity. 181 If the second
interpretation of the intent requirement is the correct one, then the
courts may have it right. "Intent" means absence of consent, either a
ante or ex post. Then again, perhaps not. Even if the defendant com-
mitted a knowing or volitional act, that act was directed not at the
chattel, but at the information located "at" (or "on," or "in") the chat-
tel. By ignoring this distinction here, too, the doctrine has taken on
the cast of trespass to land, where even innocent invasions of the
landowner's property interest justify relief. If the actual (if unacknow-
ledged) harm to the plaintiff is damage to an interest in information,
and the likely intent of the defendant is to inflict that harm (though
presumably the defendant believes that it is engaging in lawful com-
petition), the omission of a meaningful intent requirement with re-
spect to the chattel itself effectively converts trespass to chattels on the
Internet into a strict liability offense—as a claim of trespass to land is
ordinarily understood to be.
C. Anti-Circumvention and the DMCA
The Internet-as-place metaphor appears in less explicit ways in
the DMCA.182 The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA were
enacted in 1998 to enhance the remedies available to owners of copy-
righted works in the electronic network environment. The DMCA
provides civil remedies and the possibility of criminal penalties for two
related acts)" First, the act of circumventing a "technological meas-
ure that effectively controls access" to a copyrighted work is prohib-
ited under section 1201(a) (1) (A). 184 "Rio 'circumvent a technologi-
cal measure' means to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an
encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or
impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copy-
18° Prosser and Keeton recognize that the authorities diverge. Sec W. PAGE KEEION,
DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID C. OWEN, PROSSER ANI) KEEION ON Tut: LAW
or Timers § 14, at 86-88 (5th ed. 1984).
181 See, e.g., eBay, 100 F. Stipp. 2d at 1062.
18'1 See Pub. L. No, 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
183 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1203 (2000).
184 Id, § 1201(a) (1) (A).
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right owner." "[A] technological measure 'effectively controls access
to a work' if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, re-
quires the application of information, or a process or a treatment,
with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the
work."188 A related provision of the statute forbids "trafficking" in anti-
circumvention technology. 187 A second provision prohibits trafficking
in technology that is primarily designed for the purpose of circum-
venting technological protection measures that effectively protect a
right of a copyright holder. 188 "Any person" injured by a violation of
sections 1201 or 1202 189 has standing to sue. 190 No threshold of harm
need be established. 191 The act of circumventing, or trafficking in the
circumvention technology, constitutes the violation. 192
Colloquially speaking, these provisions were designed to help
electronic information proprietors "lock tip" their content, in the face
of the dangers that the Internet (with its ease of high-speed anony-
mous remote access) heralded.'" The DMCA, in other words, was
supposed to help information proprietors keep out thieves and pi-
rates by giving legal cover to their efforts to secure information tech-
nologically. 194 Copyright law alone would not he enough because elec-
tronic copying is easy to accomplish and difficult to detect.'" Click-
through agreements would be insufficient protection on the ground
that the legal framework surrounding their enforceability was of un-
certain strength, and sanctions for breach of contract provided in-
sufficient deterrence to outright theft.
Like trespass to chattels in the electronic environment, the
DMCA did not begin as a doctrine of access control. The legislative
185 1d.§ 1201 (a) (3) (A)•
' 26 M.§ 1201(a) (3) (B).
1 E17 Id. § 1201 (a) (2).
lea See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (1) (A). A parallel definition of circumventing "protection
afforded by a technological measure" appears in 17 U.S.C. § 120104 (2) (B). It appears
that the act of circumventing a technological protection measure that effectively protects a
right of a copyright holder is not unlawful tinder the MCA., if one can lawfully acquire a
device that permits doing so.
189 Section 1202 addresses maintaining the Integrity of comight management infor-
mation." See id. § 1202.
190 Id. § 1203(a).
'DI See id. § 1201.
192 See id. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (b) (1) (A).
1133 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2, 8 (1998).
194 See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised. 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 555-56 (1999).
198 &T S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2, 8.
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history of the statute is relatively clear in its reliance on place-based
metaphors (a sibling of the Internet-as-place metaphor) in support. of
the major goal of excluding thieves and pirates. 190 According to the
House Report that accompanied the final bill, "The act of Circumvent,
ing a technological protection measure put in place by a copyright
owner to control access to a copyrighted work is the electronic ecptiva-
lent of breaking into a locked room in order to obtain a copy of a
book."197 The Senate Report likewise analogized the prohibition on
trafficking in anti-circumvention technology to "making it illegal to
break into a house using a tool, the primary purpose of which is to
break into hottses."198 The better reading of the statute itself draws a
distinction between claims made under section 1201(a) (1) and (2),
which prohibit circumventing and trafficking in technology designed
to circumvent access controls (controlling the user's initial access to
the work), and section 1201(b) (1), which prohibits trafficking in
technology that permits circumventing controls guarding the rights of
the copyright holder, or copy controls (controlling what the user does
with the work after initial access). 199 The metaphors used in connec-
tion with Congress's anti-piracy rhetoric most clearly support only the
former.
In practice, the darker themes suggested by these place meta-
phors have been softened. The metaphors have been applied in serv-
ice of doctrinal claims that information proprietors may use the
DMCA to control access to information, whether or not real "piracy"
is threatened. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, the first major ju-
dicial decision interpreting (and upholding, against constitutional
challenge) the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a permanent in-
junction entered by the district court forbidding a Web site owner
from providing live links to online sources of a computer program
known as DeCSS. 2" The program allowed consumers to watch DVD-
formatted motion pictures on computers and other machines not
configured with the CSS encryption standard used by motion picture
studios, 20 ' The DeCSS program permitted "circumvention" of a
196 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17 (1998); S. REP, No. 105.190, at 11,
197 H.R. REP. No. 105.551, pt. 1. at 17.
198 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 11.
199 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a), (h) (2000).
290 273 F.3d 429, 434-35 (2d Cir. 2001).
201 Id. at 435-36. The essence of the plaintiffs' claims is captured in the court's state-
ment, "DeCSS is designed to circumvent `CSS.' the encryption technology that motion
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"technological measure" protecting copyrighted works, within the
meaning of the DMCA, specifically because it permitted consumers to
view copyrighted motion pictures without the express authorization of
the copyright owners (as expressed in the CSS technology). 202 Within
the statutory framework, the case was decided and affirmed primarily
under section 1201(a) (2), forbidding trafficking in technology defeat-
ing access controls. 203 (The plaintiff also alleged a claim under section
1201(b) (1), prohibiting trafficking in circumvention technology
aimed at copy controls.) 204 That is, the DeCSS program was a forbid-
den access control technology even if it were used by a lawful owner
of a DVD to watch that DVD on computer devices not equipped with
CSS. 205 Repeated viewing of the movie by a consumer on an unap-
proved device would constitute unauthorized access. This departure
from the reading of the statute suggested above was rationalized via
metaphor. 2°6 Reasoning from the place metaphor originally devel-
oped to punish the true pirate, the Second Circuit wrote:
Owners of all property rights are entitled to prohibit access
to their property by unauthorized persons. Homeowners can
install locks on the doors of their houses. Custodians of valu-
ables can place them in safes. Stores can attach to products
security devices that will activate alarms if the products are
taken away without purchase. These and similar security de-
vices can be circumvented. Burglars can use skeleton keys to
open door locks. Thieves can obtain the combinations to
safes. Product security devices can be neutralized.
Our case concerns a security device, CSS computer code,
that prevents access by unauthorized persons to DVD mov-
ies. The CSS code is embedded in the DVD movie. Access to
the movie cannot be obtained unless a person has a device, a
licensed DVD player, equipped with computer code capable
of decrypting the CSS encryption code. In its basic function,
picture studios place on DVDs to prevent the unauthorized viewing and copying of motion
pictures." Id. at 435-36. The extent to which the defendant svas accused of facilitating un-
authorized distribution of motion pictures via DeCSS was debated, sec id. at 438 n.5, and
was ultimately not material to the court's conclusion that the DMCA forbids distribution of
the DeCSS technology. Sec id. at 444.
2°2 Sac id.
Scc id. at 441-43.
2°4 Sec id. at 441.
205 Sec Corley, 273 F.3d at 441.
206 Sec id. at 452-53.
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CSS is like a lock on a homeowner's door, a combination of a
safe, or a security device attached to a store's products.
DeCSS is computer code that can decrypt CSS.. In its basic
function, it is like a skeleton key that can open a locked
door, a combination that can open a safe, or a device that
can neutralize the security device attached to a store's prod-
ucts. DeCSS enables anyone to gain access to a DVD movie
without using a DVD player. 207
The case did not involve access to information available solely or even
primarily on the Internet. The congruity between the court's use of
an "information-as-thing" metaphor (the forbidden DeCSS code en-
ables users to "break into" information in a container) and an Inter-
net-as-place metaphor is, however, unmistakable. 208 To the court, in-
formation "protected" by access control technology is located in a
house, or in a store, places, to be sure, even if not necessarily "lo-
cated" on the Internet. 209 This reasoning can be seamlessly extended
to electronic networked information; metaphorically, a computer
network or a Web site is no more or less a "place" than a DVD that
consists of a "home" or a "store." 210 The court made clear that the
DMCA empowers the information proprietor2" to regulate access to
information based on an absolute place-based understanding of the
electronic information environment. Moreover, the court made clear
that its concern in applying the DMCA was with the injury to the
place itself, rather than to the underlying information: "[T] he DMCA
targets the circumvention of digital walls guarding copyrighted mate-




210 In one sense, invoking "home" as a metaphorical analog here ups the ante, since
both colloquially and in real property law "homeowners" have nearly absolute rights to
control access. Disney's home, as it were, is its castle. Cf. Lexmark Mel, Inc. v. Static Con-
trol Components, Inc., No. 02•0 7-571, 2003 WL 912614, at *24 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 27, 2003)
(holding that DMCA creates both right to protect object and right to protect work.)
211
 The scope of the DMCA is formally limited to copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a) (1){A) (2000) (stating that anti-circumvention protection applies to works pro-
tected under Title 17 of the United States Code), (b) (1) (A) (stating that protection ex-
tends to circumvention that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner). It was argued
in Corky that hi practice, and as interpreted in the district court, the DMCA enables "lock-
ing up" of public domain works. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 445. The Second Circuit refused to
consider the argument on the ground that the argument was not properly presented. Sec
id.
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itself with the use of those materials after circumvention has oc-
curred. "212
In other cases interpreting the DMCA, it is clear that the meta-
phor-inspired conversion of the DMCA from a piracy-prevention
measure to a commercial access control measure is not limited to off-
line settings. In RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., the manufacturer
of computer technology used to format "streams" of audio for trans-
mission over the Internet, sued a distributor of technology that en-
abled a consumer to "capture" those streams in permanent form and
to convert the streamed format into alternative formats. 2" "Stream-
ing" music files using RealNetworks technology permits the distribu-
tor of that music to specify, technologically, that a consumer who lis-
tens to the stream over the Internet cannot download or otherwise
save a copy of the entire computer file containing the work. 2" That
technological specification includes two components: a "Secret Hand-
shake" that permits the audio stream to be transmitted only to a com-
puter program distributed by RealNetworks known as the RealPlayer,
and the "Copy Switch," which specifies whether or not the streamed
212 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 443; see also Sony Computer Entm't of Am. v. Gamemasters, 87
F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (enjoining sale of GameEnhancer device that per-
mitted consumers to bypass geographical limitations built into Sony PlayStation console
games and to play such imported games without Sony's permission; decided tinder §
1201(a) (2)); Michael Landau, Has the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Really Created a New
Exclusive Right of Access?: Attempting to Reach a Balance Between Users' and Content Providers'
Rights, 491 COPYRIGHT SOCY U.S.A. 277, 289-90 (2001). In United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203
F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1122-25 (N.D. Cal. 2002), the district court refused to dismiss criminal
DMCA charges against a firm that distributed a computer program that permitted con-
sumers to de-crypt the text of "electronic books" made available via proprietary "reader"
software that otherwise prevented consumers from making electronic copies of the under-
lying text, modifying that text, or printing copies of that text. The prosecution was brought
under section 1202(b) of the DMCA, which prohibits "trafficking" in technology that per-
mits circumvention of technological measures that effectively protect "a right of a copy-
right owner" under Title 17. Sec 17 U.S.C. § 1201(6), This section of the DMCA does not
validate access controls in the same way as section 1201(a). Instead, it appears to prohibit
technology that defeats technical limits on reproducing, distributing, or preparing deriva-
tive versions of works to which consumers already have legitimate access, i.e., copy control
technologies. Sec Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1120-21. But as interpreted, an enforceable
technological control on use becomes, in effect, an enforceable condition of access. Sec id.
at 1124-25 (concluding that Congress intended to ban all anti-circumvention technolo-
gies, regardless of their purpose); Dan L. Burk, Anti-Circumvention Misuse, UCLA L. Rtv.
(forthcoming 2003), draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=320961; Pamela Sa-
muelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J.
1575, 1643-44 (2002).
213 No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at *1 - (WD. Wash. jan. 18, 2000).
214 Id, at *2.
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audio file may be saved and/or copied. 2 I 5 The defendant's technology
permitted the consumer to bypass both and to retain a digital copy of
the work, using a program other than t.he RealPlayer. 216 Ruling on the
plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction under sections 1201(a)
(with respect to the Secret Handshake) and 1202(b) (with respect to
the Copy Switch) of the DMCA, the court granted the request. 217
It is true that only in the Corky decision was a court, in applying
the DMCA, expressly influenced by the statute's place-based meta-
phorical framework. 2 I 8 The influence of the framework appears else-
where in a subtle but significant respect that closely resembles flaws in
application of trespass-to-chattels doctrine. Trespass-to-chattels cases
have proceeded with little concern that prospective defendants might
not be able to discern the difference between legitimate and illegiti-
mate entry, that is, between injury to a tangible interest and injury to
an intangible one, Courts in DMCA cases have seized on the "locked
house" metaphor without measuring it against the actual effectiveness
of the "locks" found in the real world or asking whether legally pro-
tecting the "lock" gets at the interest that the plaintiff is trying to pro-
tect. 219 Here the influence of the information-as-thing metaphor is
much in evidence; the Internet—as-place (or electronic-environment,
as-place) metaphor is implicit. Under the DMCA, weaker locks, and
houses that do not appear to be locked, get at least as much legal pro-
215 Id.
216 Id. at *4.
217 See id. at *7-9. The case clearly involved application of the DMCA as access control
rather than "piracy prevention." As the court characterized the plaintiff's claim:
Copyright owners also use RealNetworks' technology so that end-users can lis-
ten to, but not record, music that is on sale, either at a Web site or in retail
stores. Other copyright owners enable users to listen to content on a "pay-per-
play" basis that requires a payment for each time the end-user wants to hear
the content. Without the security measures afforded by RealNetworks, these
methods of distribution could not succeed. End-users could make and redis-
tribute digital copies of any content available on the Internet, undermining
the market for the copyrighted original.
Id. at *3.
218 To the extent that the Internet-as-place and information-as-thing represent efforts
to physicalize purely intangible phenomena, the vocabulary of Reathretwodis (the Secret
Handshake, the defendant's Streambox VCR device, the Copy Switch) is highly sympa-
thetic. The court compared the defendant's technology to a "black box" that could he
used to intercept and descramble cable or satellite television signals. ReatNetzvolAs, 2000 WL
127311, at*4.
219
	 this is a manifestation of the absence of the Internet-as-place metaphor,
since one might expect to see greater emphasis on genuine gates or fences by courts en-
amored of the physical analogy. The parhdox, then, is that courts rely on the metaphor.
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tection as do good, strong locks. And the lock itself appears to be a
protected interest, even though the underlying information is what
the plaintiff is truly trying to guard. In both respects, prospective de-
fendants have legitimate concerns regarding notice of their potential
liability.
Both the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, in its opinion in Corky, and the U.S. District Court for the West-
ern District of Washington, in its opinion in RealNetworks, ruled that a
"technological measure" may "effectively" protect against the unau-
thorized access to or copying of copyrighted works (and therefore
qualify the plaintiff for DMCA relief) even if the technological access
harrier imposed can be evaded with relative ease. 220 In RealNetworks,
the court reasoned that the plaintiff's technology was intended to
prevent capture and copying of the digital audio files themselves, even
if the copyrighted works could be easily captured and copied by other
(non-digital) means. 22t The effectiveness of the technological meas-
ure related, in other words, to a tangible attribute of the plaintiffs
product (its electronic format), or information-as-thing, rather than
to the intangible copyright interest that the DMCA nominally pro-
tects. 222 The district court in Corley more directly relied on the place
metaphor in its analysis of this issue, by analogizing distributing the
DeCSS program to publishing the combination to a bank vault. 223
D. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Like click-through agreements, for the information proprietor
the DMCA has its weaknesses as an access control technique. The in-
formation proprietor must invest in at least a trivial "technological
protection measure" before the provisions of the DMCA can be in-
voked.224 More important, the DMCA encompasses only wrongful ac-
220 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, II 1 F, Stipp. 2d 294, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y.
2000). affd sub nom., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.34 429 (2d Cir. 2001);
RealNctworks, 2000 WL 127311. at *9; cf. Samuelson & Scotchmer, SUPM note 212, at 1646-
48 & n. 333 (describing how MICA stunts competitive incentives to produce truly effective
technological protection measures).
221 See RealNetworks. 200011'L 127311, at *9.
222
 The defendant could, therefore, plausibly argue that the intangible copyrighted
work was subject to no access or rights control whatsoever.
223 See Rcirnerdcs, 111  F. Stipp. 2d at 315.
21'4 The DMCA plaintiff also must contend with limited statutory exceptions for reverse
engineering, security testing, and encryption research, see 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (I). (g). (j)
(2000), and with arguments that the statute is unconstitutional. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 458
(rejecting First Amendment challenge).
2003]	 Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet 	 479
cess to copyrighted works and invasion of the rights of copyright own-
ers. Information not protected by copyright law formally falls outside
the statute. To fill these gaps, information proprietors have begun re-
cently to enforce access restrictions by relying on the federal CFAA. 225
The CFAA generally provides both criminal penalties and civil relief
in connection with claims of unauthorized access to a "protected
computer."226
 Originally enacted before the commercial development
of the Internet in order to help secure government and related spe-
cial-purpose computers from hackers, the CFAA now reaches many
different kinds of unauthorized access to almost any computer con-
nected to the Internet. 227
 As with the law of trespass to chattels, the
CFAA was originally designed to keep "bad" information (and people)
out, 228
 rather than "good" information in, by denying competitors and
consumers access except on the proprietor's terms. As with the tres-
pass cases, the law has expanded to cover both situations. The Inter-
net-as-place metaphor has helped the cause of those who rely on the
CFAA to control unauthorized "access" not only to computer systems
themselves, but to the information that those computers contain.
For ordinary civil liability purposes, the CFAA applies to anyone
who: (1) "intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or
exceeds authorized access [and thereby obtains] information from
any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or for-
eign communication;"229
 (2) "knowingly causes the transmission of a
program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such
conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a pro-
225 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000), amended by USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56,
§ 814, 115 Stat. 272, 382-84, 21st Century Department of justice Appropriations Authori-
zation ,
 Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 4002, 116 Stat. 1758, 1807-08 (2002), and Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 225, 116 Stat. 2135, 2158.
226 A "protected computer" under the statute includes a computer "which is used in in-
terstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside
the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or
communication of the United States." Id. § 1030(e) (2) (B).
227
 Brief histories of the CFAA are provided in Eric J. Bakewell et al., Computer Crimes,
38 Am. Citim. L. Rev. 481, 987-95 (2001), and Dodd S. Griffith, Note, The Computer Fraud
and Abuse Art of 1986: A Measured Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453, 455-
66 (1990).
225
 See In re Doubleaick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Stipp. 2d 497, 524-26 (S.D.N.I: 2001)
(dismissing CFAA claim that defendant placed "cookies" on computers of Internet site
visitors); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Stipp. 2d 1121,
1125-26 (MD. Wash. 2000) (stating that disloyal employee's theft of trade secrets from
employer's computer system supported CFAA LCG141, 46 F. Stipp. 2d at 451-52
(treating sending of spam as CFAA violation).
229 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2).
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tected computer;"230 (3) "intentionally accesses a protected computer
without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly
causes damage;"231 (4) "intentionally accesses a protected computer
without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes dam-
age; "232 or
 (5) "by conduct described in ... subparagraph (A) [(2)–
(4) above], caused (or, in the case of an attempted offense, would, if
completed, have caused)—(i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-
year period aggregating at least $5,000 in value."233
The civil relief provision of the CFAA provides: "Any person who
suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may
maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory
damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief." 234 An Inter-
net-connected computer resource is a "protected computer." 2" Re-
duced to its essence, therefore, the CFAA authorizes a civil claim (and
raises the possibility of criminal prosecution) against anyone who ac-
cesses a computer connected to the Internet without the permission
of its owner and causes at least $5,000 worth of "loss." 236
Despite its anti-hacking origins, 237 the CFAA, and subsections
1030(a) (2) and 1030(a) (5) in particular, appears on its face to justify
interpreting the statute as an access-control regime in the same com-
mercial law sense as the law of trespass to chattels and the DMCA. As
with those two areas, that interpretation does not distinguish between
wrongful access to the computer system itself, on the one hand, and
to the information stored on it ; on the other. Access is wrongful if it is
230 Id. § 1030(a) (5) (A).
231 Id .
232 Id .
233 Id. § 1030(a) (5) (B) (i). The civil liability subsections of the CFAA were modified
slightly by the USA Patriot Act of 2001 to clarify that the $5,000 threshold can be satisfied
only by damage caused by a single act. See Pub. L. 107-56, § 814, 115 Stat. 272, 382-84.
234 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). The balance of this subsection reinforces the substantive pre-
requisites for a civil claim: "A civil action for a violation of this section may be brought only
if the conduct involves 1 of the factors set forth in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of sub-
section (a) (5) (B)." Subsection (i) is quoted in the text above. Subsections (ii) through (v)
address physical injury and damage to public health, safety, and security.
"5 Id. § 1030 (e) .
236 See id. § 1030.
237 See United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1078 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that in-
tention of CFAA felony provisions is to punish attempts to steal valuable data, not to pun-
ish mere unauthorized access); N. Tex. Preventative Imaging, L.L.C. v. Eisenberg, No. SA
CV 96-71AHS(EEX), 1996 WL 1359212, at *4—*6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 1996) (finding that
1994 CFAA amendments shifted statutory focus to the defendant's intent, from unauthor-
ized access itself, tinder section 1030(a) (5)).
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"without authorizadon" or "exceeds authorized . access."2" Whose
authority counts for CFAA purposes? Authority of the owner of prop-
erty rights in the target computer, or in a computer system involved in
the access? Or authority of the owner of property rights in the infor-
mation acquired? Either, or both? It appears that courts have not paid
close attention to these distinctions. 239 As with trespass to chattels doc-
trine and the DMCA, the Internet-as-place metaphor has reinforced
this muddiness and enhanced the CFAA's standing as a budding
commercial law regime. For example, in Registercom the plaintiff in-
cluded a claim under subsections of the CFAA that prohibited unau-
thorized access to a protected computer that caused damage 24° and
that led to obtaining infOrmation. 241 The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District. of New York entered a preliminary injunction,
based in part on its finding that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on
its CFAA claim of obtaining information without authorization. 2 ' 12 Re-
cently, in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit held that accessing a competitor's Web site
using a robot or spider program to collect price information from the
site, in order to use that information to offer competitive services
(overseas tours for student groups), made out a CFAA violation. 243
The court affirmed entry of a preliminary injunction by the district
court. 244
213 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2).
2" See, e.g., United Slates v. Morris, 928 F.2(1 504, 509-10 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that
computer use is "without authorization" if it is not in any way related to the intended func-
tion of the computer); Doe v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctn. No. CIV 00-100-M, 2001 WI,
873063, at *5-6 (D.N.H. July 19, 2001) (physician accessing patient records potentially
liable under CFAA for exceeding scope of authority granted by physician's employer);
LCGM. 46 F. Stipp. 2d at 451 (CFAA violation made out when span e-made-mail sent to
AOL accounts in violation of plaintiff's customer agreement with AOL and AOL Terms of
Service). At least one court has distinguished use of the concept of "access" tinder the
CFAA from its cousin iu trespass. implying, among other things, that "implied consent" or
"implied license" is no defense to a CFAA claim. See In re Am. Online, Inc., 168 F. Stipp. 2d
1359. 1370 n.8 (S.D. Fla, 2001).
24° 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (5) (A) (iii); Registet.ann, 126 F. Stipp. 2d at 241.
241 18 U.S.0 §1030(a)(2)(C); Registencom, 126 F. Stipp. 2d at 241. This subsection re-
fers to the unauthorized obtaining of information from a protected computer. The USA
Patriot Act made clear that civil claims for violation of this subsection can be brought only
if the plaintiff also establishes a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (5) (B).
242 Sec Rep' sto:corn, 126 F. Stipp. 2d at 251-53.
241 274 F.3d 577, 579, 582-85 (1st Cir. 2001). The injunction entered by the district
court was based on, and affirmed with respect to, 18 U,S.C. § 1030(a) (4), which prohibits
unauthorized access to a protected computer, and thereby obtaining anything of value,
"with intent to defraud." Id. at 582 n.10, 583-84.
244 Id. at 583-84.
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The court's reliance on Internet-as-place reasoning in Explorica is,
given the prior review of trespass and DMCA cases, unsurprising. The
computer program used by the defendants was known as a "scraper,"
because its object was to "scrape" up information on the target Web
site. The court also described the misbehavior of the program as it
"mined" the plaintiff's Web site and "navigated" the Web site struc-
ture. 245
 What is moderately surprising is how clearly the opinion relies
on the metaphor while giving no weight to how that metaphor fails to
capture the challenged practice. 246 Proving a CFAA violation requires,
among other things, that the defendant have accessed the "protected
computer" without authorization or by exceeding authorization." 7
The basis for the First Circuit's finding that the defendant did not
have authority to access the plaintiffs site was a confidentiality
agreement executed by one of the defendants, as a former employee
of the plaintiff. 248 Because the data that the defendants used to pro-
gram the "scraper" were allegedly "confidential" within the meaning
of the confidentiality agreement, which covered EF Cultural Travel's
secret technical, business, or financial information, their access to the
plaintiff's computer was "unauthorized."249
 But was it? The technical
data concerned access to (or in truth, use of) the information stored
on the Web site, rather than access to the computer itself. Nothing
that the defendants did exceeded their authorized access to the com-
puter. The computer was freely accessible by anyone with the ability to
use the Internet. Had the plaintiff brought a lawsuit for misappropria-
tion of trade secrets, the claim might well have been rejected. The
technical information was publicly displayed to anyone who browsed
price data on the plaintiffs Web site. 25° A trade secrets claim at least
would have addressed the merits of what the defendants allegedly did
wrong. By re-characterizing the defendant's acquisition of competitive
information as "unauthorized access" under the CFAA ("breaking in"
to a protected area, "navigating" around it, and "mining" it for its
valuables) rather than "misappropriation of trade secrets" (allegedly
unethical competitive conduct), the court conflated access to the
145 See id. at 583.
246 See id. at 583-84.
247 See supra notes 229-233 and accompanying text.
248 See Explorica, 274 F.3d at 582.
249 See id.
2" To avoid this point, the court concluded that the "confidential" data obtained by
the defendant by virtue of his employment enabled the scraper to collect information
much more quickly than another individual could. Sec id. at 583 n.16.
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physical with access to the virtual. The plaintiff was able to obtain an
injunction against a lower-cost competitor, at essentially no cost to it-
self. 251
A companion case, decided a little over a year later, avoids sonic
of the most pronounced metaphorical errors discussed above -without,
in the end, solving the underlying problem. In that regard, the case
provides a useful transition to the discussion in the next. Part. In EF
CHItural Travel BV v. Zefer Corti., the Court of Appeals for the First. Cir-
cuit addressed the same underlying facts presented in Expfo•ica. 252
 The
defendant, Zefer, produced the software used in the "unauthorized"
scraping and had been named as a defendant in the initial litiga-
tion.253 Though not named as a party subject to the initial preliminary
injunction, affirmed in Explorica, Zefer appealed the injunction as ap-
plied to its activities. 25• The appeal was delayed by its intervening
bankruptcy proceeding. 255 When the bankruptcy stay was lifted, the
appeal proceeded. 256 Reviewing the injunction a second time, the
First Circuit affirmed it again, on the narrow ground that. Zefer, like
any third party with notice of the injunction, was prohibited from act-
ing in concert with or at the direction of Explorica to use the scraper
tool to access EF Cultural Travel's price information. 257
 The court
thus had no need to address again the metaphorical concerns that.
buttressed its earlier ruling.
Nonetheless, in dicta, the court offered significant guidance for
future application of the CFAA. As noted in Explorica, the district
court entered the preliminary injunction by reasoning that the de-
fendants had exceeded the "reasonable expectations" of both the Web
site owner and its users. 258 As applied to Explorica, the court affirmed
the injunction without addressing this "reasonable expectations" in-
terpretation. 258 As applied to Zefer, the court seized the opportunity
to declare that the standard was justified neither by the language of
251 The plaintiff provided little or no advance notice that it had withdrawn permission
to browse its site, and it offered no technical resistance to the operation of the "scraper"
itself. See id. The court declined to rule on the adequacy of any no access" notice posted
by the plaintiff. See hi.
252 318 F.3d 58,59-60 (1st Cir. 2003).
255 Id. at 60-61.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 61.
258 Id.
Scc Zefcr, 318 F.3d at 63-64.
258 Explorica, 274 F.3d at 580-81,
259 Id. at 583-84.
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the statute nor by good public policy. 260
 Instead, the court suggested
that the Web site owner could withdraw authority to visit the site by
using an explicit notice—or link—on the relevant Web page or Web
site, stating what uses are forbidden:
[W]e think that the public website provider can easily spell
out explicitly what is forbidden and, consonantly, that noth-
ing justifies putting users at the mercy of a highly imprecise,
litigation-spawning standard like 'reasonable expectations.'
If EF wants to ban scrapers, let it say so on the webpage or a
link clearly marked as containing restrictions.261
This dicta does not depend, even to the extent that the earlier
opinion in Explorica did, on explicit characterizations of the plaintiffs
Web site and the defendants' activities as involving improper access to
a physical place or tangible thing. (An implicit acceptance of this us-
age continued. The court noted that the case involved a "scraper
tool, "262
 and that the plaintiff's Web site was designed to require that
users view "only one page at a time.") 2" Yet the court continued its
conflation of concerns over injury to intangible interests in informa-
tion and injury to- tangible interests in computer systems. The court
went out of its way to acknowledge the public nature of the plaintiffs
Web site as a whole and of all of the price information that it con-
tained. 264
 The court went further, noting that copyright and unfair
competition laws would likely prevent the plaintiff even from using an
explicit notice to prevent Zefer from simply viewing that information
as would an "ordinary" user. 265
 If a future defendant in Zefer's posi-
tion were to ignore such a "no scraping" notice by viewing publicly
available information on the plaintiffs Web site using a "scraper tool,"
what would be the nature of the injury? It could only be an injury
framed in terms of injury to a tangible interest—the Web site, or the
Internet, as place—wrought by a tangible thing, the "scraper tool."
The continuing (implicit) recognition of the Internet-as-place meta-
phor in this context might be contrasted with the different use of that
266 &ler, 318 F.3d at 63.
261 Id. Elsewhere in the opinion, the court noted that public policy might limit the na-
ture of such restrictions. See id. at 62.
262 Sec id. at 60.
263 Id. at 62.
264 See id. at 60.
266 Sec Zefer, 318 F.3d at 63.
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metaphor by the Second Circuit in Specht.266 Bypassing a "no scraping"
notice merely posted on a Web site might be enough, under Zefet; to
sustain civil liability tinder the CFAA. 267
 With respect to a contract.
claim, under Specht, bypassing an equivalent. notice would not support.
liability. 268
III. ACCESS AND THE SHAPE OF THE INTERNET
The foregoing critique of recent. cases decided under the CFAA,
the DMCA, and the doctrine of trespass to chattels, argues that courts
have erred by relying on an Internet-as-place metaphor without prop-
erly connecting that metaphor to interests in intangible information
that have been at issue. By contrast, cases applying contract and
commercial law to click-through agreements have, over time, recog-
nized (at least formally) both producer and consumer interests in in-
tangibles, without adopting a persuasive metaphor. A bit of doctrinal
and metaphorical consistency is in order, to the extent that these doc-
trines address the same commercial interests and to the extent. that
the metaphor carries substantial descriptive weight. 269 This Part as-
sumes that the overlap of commercial interests, implicit in the previ-
ous Part, will cause the reach of these doctrines to continue to ex-
pand. It also assumes that the Internet-as-place metaphor will
continue to be far more descriptively powerful than any alternative
for transactions in information. It argues, then, that a more effective
understanding of this metaphor can help these different doctrines
work more consistently.
Others have argued that courts have erred because their use of
an Internet-as-place metaphor has not been sufficiently sensitive to
nuances in legal doctrines governing use of and access to land. 270 The
error may run more deeply. Courts have not appreciated why the land
metaphor lacks the absolutist dimension that they often assume, or, to
put the matter differently, how the metaphor maps onto individuals'
perceptions of the world and thus supports a much more elaborate
argumentative vocabulary than courts have recognized. In the real
266 See supra notes 110-127 and accompanying text.
2" Sre &fen 318 F.3d at 63-64.
26B See supra notes 110-127 and accompanying text.
266
 See generally Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectan-
cies: A Clash of Tort and Contmet Doctrine, 49 U. Cut. L. It•v. 01 (1982) (arguing that tort and
contract doctrines should be interpreted consistently when applied to the same acts, when
policy objectives coincide).
272 See HIM ter, supra note 27: Lemley. supra note 42.
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world, property is understood and used in context-specific ways. Over
time, the limits supplied by context are embodied in law,271 and en-
rich our vocabulary of property. By failing to tap into that context-
and experience-based vocabulary, courts using the simplest form of
the Internet-as-place metaphor are imposing legal rules that do not
resonate in our experience of the Internet and that are not, there-
fore, likely to have whatever effect on our behavior that courts intend.
Instead, if the Internet is a place of metaphorical real property, prop-
erty-like regulation should be based on how its users understand and
use it.
How do we understand and appreciate the "place" that is the
Internet? If the Internet were really a place, what would it look like?
Or how would those people who "live," "work," or "play" there de-
scribe it? Physical environments have objective, describable physical
characteristics. Real property law reflects user experience with them.
It is a relatively straightforward (if somewhat technical) matter to map
the physical characteristics of the Internet. 272 In the offline world, a
seminal study concluded forty years ago that the physical reality of the
place may not be as important to its inhabitants as their understand-
ing of that reality. 273 What makes a place a "place" is a combination of
features, some mappable using objective techniques, many others
constituted by individuals through their experience of "using" the
place.274 Implicitly, the law of a place will reflect these perceptions at
least as much as, if not more than, those features themselves.
In this study, Kevin Lynch and a team of researchers from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology undertook to interview inhabi-
tants of three cities (Boston, Massachusetts; Jersey City, New Jersey;
and Los Angeles, California) to learn about their "readings," or maps,
of those cities. 275 The goal of the research was to determine how peo-
ple constituted the physical environment they occupied• 276 What did
they identify as landmarks in their lives, the boundaries of their terri-
tory or neighborhood? 277 What did they understand as "public" and
271 Cf. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711,779-81 (1986).
272 See supra note 46 (pointing out distinctions among layers" of the Internet).
273 Surprisingly, perhaps, given the nature of the findings, the study has not been re-
peated.
274 See KEVIN LYNCH, THE IMAGE or THE ark' 2,8-13 (1960);josEpti RVICIVERT, THE
SEDUCTION or PLACE: THE CITY IN	 WEN-IN-FIRST CENTURY 133 (2000).
275 LYNCH, supra note 274, at 14,
276 Id. at 2.
277 See id. at 140-41, 43-85.
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"private" spaces and categories inbetween? 278 The results, published as
The Image of the City, revealed, as the scholar Joseph Rykwert later ar-
gued, that "[p]oints of orientation are essential for any sane urban or
rural living. Without them a citizen cannot 'read,' let alone 'under-
stand' his home."279 Lynch's research identified certain common and
important themes: "[I]f the environment is visibly organized and
sharply identified, then the citizen can inform it with his own mean-
ings and connections. Then it will become a true place, remarkable
and unmistakable."288
 The organization and distinction typically de-
rived from an inventory of features and boundaries includes open
space, contrasts, and a sense of motion. 281 Paths, edges, nodes, land-
marks, and distinct districts played key roles to Lynch's subjects. 282
Taken together, the degree to which these features were present in a
given physical environment was a measure of its "imageability," a term
that Lynch defined as "that quality in a physical object which gives it a
high probability of evoking a strong image in any given observer. It is
that shape, color, or arrangement which facilitates the making of viv-
idly identified, powerfully structured, highly useful mental images of
the enviromnent."2" An "imageable" city was a city that conveyed a
coherent mental map to its inhabitants, that its inhabitants could un-
derstand and use to organize their lives, and that enabled them to re-
alize their potential as citizens. 284 From the urban planning stand-
point, the benefits of a more highly imageable environment were the
potential it yielded for productive development and exploration by
individual citizens. 285
Lynch's research was designed to encourage urban planners to
develop imageable places. 288 Its implications go further. A cognitive
278 Sec id.
278 RYEWERT, supra note 274. at 133. Rykwert goes on to contrast the variety of experi-
ence represented in Lynch's study with the "standardization of space" represented by late
twentieth-century capitalism.
288 LYNCH, supra note 274, at 92.
281 Id. at 16.
282 Id. at 46-49.
2a3 Id. at 9. "A highly imageable (apparent, legible, or visible) city in this peculiar sense
would seem well formed, distinct, remarkable; it would invite the eye and the ear to
greater attention and participation." Id. at 10.
284 Sec id. at 108-10.
288 Cf. LYNCH, supra note 274. at 108-10, 119.
286 Information researcher's have for some time been exploring how to adapt the int-
ageability idea to the Internet. See. e.g., Matthew Chalmers et al.. Adding Imagability Features
to Information Displays, in PRoccEntrws OF 'ME 9111 ANNUAL ACM SYMPOSIUM ON USER
INTERFACE SOFTWARE AND TECHNOLOGY 33, 33-38 (Ass'n for Computing Mach., Inc.,
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approach to metaphor argues that our use of language depends in
large part not on objective reality but on our understanding of 'hat
reality. 287 Metaphor is not merely language. It reflects a system of
thought. 288 It follows that whatever the influence of language on law,
that influence should follow our understanding of the sources of that
usage. Any other relationship creates a needless risk of our legal struc-
tures failing sufficiently to correspond to other social structures, a sort
of cognitive dissonance on a grand scale. As Part II showed, the Inter-
net-as-place metaphor has a deeper impact on law than in merely sug-
gesting ways to talk about the Internet. Our uses of the language of
place reflect our understanding of place. 289 As courts' use of the place
metaphor has informed the law, a correct understanding of the meta-
phor can help repair some of the resulting errors. The Internet may
not be, nor should it be, a wholly imageable place in Lynch's sense.290
As imageability is a useful way to think about our physical places, the
idea of imageability provides a useful starting point for discussing how
to adapt the benefits of a place metaphor to the Internet, "Imageabil-
ity," or designing a user environment so that users can comprehend it,
is important not only to the idea of personal growth and exploration
(the argument from urban planning), but to the idea of a coherent
environment for economic and commercial development. 291
If the Internet, or the relevant commercial and/or technical con-
text, lacks imageability, to borrow Lynch's term, or significant
"boundaries," in a more accessible sense, it is hardly fair or efficient to
impose what is in law or in practice a regime of strict liability for
wrongful access to a computer when the harm alleged is misuse or ap-
UIST '96 Symposium, 1996), available at http://dolacm.org/10.1145/237091.237096;
Younghee Jung & Alison Lee, Design of Social Interaction Environment for Electronic Market-
places, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS ON DESIGNING INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS: PROCESSES,
PRACTICES, NIE'ITIODS AND TECIINNUES 129, 129-36 (Ass'n for Computing Mach., Inc.,
DIS '00 Symposium. 2000), available at http://doi ,acm.org/10.1145/347642.347690 . For
an overview of the field of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), see the resources col-
lected at ACM/SIGCHI, at http://www.acm.org/sigchi  (last visited Mar. 14, 2003).
287 Sec supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
288 Sec supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
290 See LYNCH, supra note 274, at 9,
291 See Wendyl Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consis-
tency. Consent, and Encouragement Theory, .11 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1380 (1989) ("In short, an
interdependent world requires demarcations to avoid paralysis and preserve valuable, mu-
tually beneficial reciprocities.").
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propriation of valuable information. 292 To the extent that courts and
Congress are concerned about wrongful or anticompetitive use of in-
formation, and want to influence user behavior to limit misuse, then
the way in which the Internet-as-place metaphor has been used to
date misses that goal entirely. If the relevant interest in access cases is
truly the information stored "on" the Web site, then the problem cre-
ated by current usage of the Internet-as-place metaphor is that pro-
spective defendants typically have little effective way to "see" the liabil-
ity that they may later confront, because they cannot "see" the
Internet or its boundaries. Defendants are punished for invading
plaintiff's place-like "property" without necessarily being aware that
they have committed a wrong.293 Develop significant boundaries in
some sense, and the Internet becomes visible. It acquires a shape,
from the user's perspective. The Internet-as-place metaphor becomes
more than just metaphor. It resonates in practice. The place meta-
phor acquires meaning.
Giving substance to the Internet-as-place metaphor from the
user's perspective is appropriate at the least because those who access
information on the Internet, and are bound by the regulatory
schemes described above, are entitled as a matter of simple fairness to
have the language that courts and legislatures invoke to define their
experience match that experience itself. Both the choice of user per-
spective and place as the source of metaphorical meaning make sense
292 Previous arguments of this sort have advocated that the law do more to balance
owner and user interests. Sec O'Rourke, supra note 41; cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Per-
spective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. 1..J. (forthcoming 2003), drillt available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract_id=310020 (arguing that legal questions concerning the Internet may be ana-
lyzed differently depending on the choice of a "reality-based" (external) or "virtual-reality-
based" (internal) perspective).
293 See, e.g., supra notes 150-153. 243-251 and accompanying text. Johnson & Post
wrote:
Treating Cyberspace as a separate 'space" to which distinct law apply [sic]
should come naturally, There is a "placeness" to Cyberspace because the mes-
sage access [sic] there are persistent and accessible to many people. Further-
more, because entry into this world of stored online communications occurs
through a screen and (usually) a password boundary, you know when you are
"there." No one accidentally strays across the border into Cyberspace.
Johnson & Post, supra note 3, at 1379 (footnotes omitted). Their last point may be true,
although it precedes my argument. No one accidentally strays into cyberspace, but once
"in" cyberspace, it is all too easy to stray across hidden boundaries. Cf. ii4V'ILLIAM J.
MITCHELL, CETI OF hits: SPACE, PLACE & TiIF INFOPIAIIN 151 (1995) ("The great power
struggles of cyberspace will be over network topology, connectivity, and access—not the
geographic borders and chunks of territory that have been fought over in the past.").
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from other policy perspectives. 294 One might argue that the primary
concern of information policy is preservation and content of the pub-
lic domain. 295
 In that event, information resources ought not to be
privatized without good reason; inadequate boundary-making blurs
the public/private distinction and puts the public domain at unneces-
sary risk. Such an instrumental argument might he reversed (anti
courts invoking Internet-as-place and contract-as-assent metaphors
have, when relying on policy justifications, tended to do so), 296 but
with the same result. Inadequate boundary-making means that infor-
mation producers will have imperfect and potentially inadequate in-
centives to produce information. One might view property and assent
as ends in themselves, 297
 a perspective that supposes defined and
definable property rights, and conditionS that permit the exercise of
autonomous choice by the individual. Boundary-making enables
both.
In the doctrinal context, boundary-making means making people
aware of the boundaries that exist, whether those boundaries are
physical, logical, or lega1. 298
 A technical boundary—a rights manage-
ment scheme, for example—would not automatically be sufficient if it
did not effectively communicate the existence of a boundary to the
user. Imageability and visibility are cultural phenomena, not inevita-
ble or natural consequences of certain tangible features. In the non-
electronic world, tangible boundaries perform this function, in the
information environment as well as elsewhere, but their effectiveness
derives not just from their tangible nature but also from our cultural
understanding of what physical barriers mean. 299 Common sense sug-
294 Sec Orin S. Kerr, Are We Overprotecting Cade? Thoughts on First-Generation Internet Law,
57 WASH, & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1289-90 (2000) (arguing for greater focus on function of
Internet technology, rather than on the essential technical form of the technology, in
analysis of Internet legal problems); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85
VA. L. REv. 1163, 1163-66 (1999) (arguing for regulatory framework based on character of
application programs used on the Internet, because the character of different applications
affects user perceptions of the character of cyberspace).
295 Sec Benkler, supra note 9, at 354 (arguing that baseline in law regulating informa-
tion, including creative works, should be that they are "free as the air to common use,"
citing Justice Brandeis's famous dissenting opinion in International News Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
296 See, e.g., supra notes 86-106, 146-149 and accompanying text.
297 See Barnett, supra note 37, at 291-319.
298 cf. Benkler, supra note 46.
299 See Gordon, supra note 291, at 1354-94 (arguing that the legal boundaries provided
by the rules of the 1976 Copyright Act largely serve the same functions as the physical
boundaries of tangible property, under pre-1976 law); see also supra note 46 and authorities
discussed therein.
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gests that one ought not to be held liable for an offense in the ab-
sence of some rational basis for imputing knowledge that harm may
result or that an offense may be committed, and for identifying the
harm that results from the violation. 3" In the context of each of the
four bodies of law reviewed in Part II, and for any equivalent body of
law brought to bear on the question of unauthorized "access" to in-
formation and computer resources, courts should require that the
plaintiff or party that wishes to enforce any type of access limitation
bear the burden of establishing the existence of a relevant feature of
the information environment that creates, with respect. to some
significant number of users of that environment, a salient or visible
boundary between open, public information and information subject
to access constraints. Giving actual notice of the access restriction to
the individual user may not be sufficient. Such a notice may be pre-
sented in a form or context that lacks salience or visibility from the
user's perspective, and thus fails to correspond in any meaningful way
to what courts describe as the user's experience of the Internet-as-
place. From a policy perspective, enforcement of a particular term or
feature might arguably be fair, or efficient, or properly instrumental
in its effect with respect to a particular user, but there is no reason to
assume that like conditions apply with respect to all users. The plain-
tiff, in other words, should establish not merely notice, btu. imageabil-
ity, from the user's perspective. To employ legal rather than planning
terminology, the plaintiff should prove foreseeability from the perspec-
tive of the user. If a significant number of users cannot foresee the po-
tential harm from exceeding an alleged access control, or see the
Internet, the individual user ought not to be held accountable for
breaches of legal standards governing access to Internet. resources.
The next Part of this Article explores and explains this proposal.
500 Ignorance of the law may be no excuse, as the proverb says, but liability is rarely
imposed absent some rational basis for concluding that the defendant (or the accused)
should have beets aware that legal consequences attached to its conduct. Sec Intercom,
v. Bell Atl. Internet Solutions, Inc., 205 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that
defendant "purposefully availed" itself of state's law when it continued to route e-mail traf-
fic through servers located in that state after notice of harm caused by such routing). But
see Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 619-20 (E.D. Va. 2002) (find-
big personal jurisdiction in Virginia over defendants accused of trespass to chattels caused
by spam, despite absence of evidence in the record that defendants knew that plaintiff's
servers were located there); State v. Maxwell, 767 N.E. 2d 242. 247, 250 (Ohio 2002) (The
court reinstated the conviction for importing child pornography over the dissent of J.
Lundberg Stratton, who wrote: ICI barging individuals with the knowledge of the internal
workings of their Internet service provider is repugnant to fairness and due process.").
492	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 44:433
IV. A LAW OF ACCESS
The term "foreseeability" is meant to capture in legal terms the
idea that if a plaintiff wants to erect barriers to access to information,
and to rely on physical space metaphors to enforce those barriers le-
gally, then that plaintiff ought to be required to signal to potential
defendants that their conduct is potentially wrongful. 501 In cases of
trespass to land, it is said that the wrongful entry by the defendant
must be "intentional," in the sense that the defendant mast be shown
to have intended to be where the defendant was found. 302 Landown-
ers have no obligation to post signs or build fences as a condition of
recovering for trespass, but the clarity of their entitlement to eject
trespassers must stein from the likelihood that the trespasser either
actually knows, or is in an excellent position ex ante to determine,
whether entry is authorized. 393 In cases of virtual access, a foreseeabil-
ity standard substitutes for that clarity. 304 Although not intended to
import all of the complexity and subtlety of foreseeability analysis
from tort law, the standard does .evoke the tort-law foreseeability in-
3" In other areas of law involving intellectual property , and involving the Internet, a
foreseeability standard has been suggested recently as a preferred way of managing com-
peting producer and consumer interests. See Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeabilily in
Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1045, 1064-68 (2001) (summarizing uses of foresee-
ability doctrine in patent law as well as in tort and contract law); Michael A. Geist, Is There a
Them Them? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. Li. 1345,
1380-84 (2001) (arguing in favor of a "targeting criterion" for questions of personal juris-
diction involving Internet-related contacts); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 740-41 (2002) (largely adopting foreseeability standard
for equivalents analysis in patent law).
30 See Nat'l Coal Bd. v, I.E. Evans & Co., 2 K.B. 861, 865 (C.A. 1951), available at 1951
WL 11384 (English court reviewing evolution away from regime of strict liability and hold-
ing that defendant was not liable in trespass for harm to an underground cable which he
nonnegligendy struck while excavating in a field); KrEroN rr AL., supra note 180. § 13, at
73-74. Negligent invasion of land will support a claim of trespass. but as a practical matter
such a claim will sound directly in negligence.
so See Ian Ayres, Protecting Property With Puts, 32 VAL. U. L REV. 793, 829 (1998)
("When Rose steals my watch or builds an encroaching wall or becomes a holdover tenant,
Rose usually knows at the time that she is unlawfully impairing my entitlement. In contrast,
it is more difficult for Rose to know in advance whether her noise or dust emission will
constitute a nuisance."). Economic models similarly distinguish between trespass and nui-
sance generally on the ground that the former arises in contexts where transactions costs
between the parties are low. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE Eco-
NOMIC Si-tutu -runt or TORT LAw 42-48 (1987); Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance and
the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 23-26 (1985),
3° Cases of trespass to land that do not involve classic interference with possession
have at times, and for similar reasons, relied on a similar balancing approach to gauge the
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. Sec Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P,2d
790, 794-96 (Or. 1959).
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quirt', More specifically; it evokes the notion that in the absence of a
considered determination that a regime of strict liability is appropri-
ale, 305 a defendant ordinarily ought to be liable to a plaintiff only for
conduct that the defendant. can either plan to avoid, or for which the
defendant (and the court) can calculate (and perhaps obtain insur-
ance for) compensation. 306 The goal in this Part, then, is to use the
foreseeability standard to harmonize . application of the four areas of
law described in Part. IL Our thinking, language, and law about virtual
places should mirror their equivalents in the world of real places. A
foreseeability standard implements that argument in a unified way;
across doctrinal lines.
There are two important points to emphasize in this context.
First, because much of the rest of this Part discusses clear or effective
barriers and boundaries, I do not mean to argue that a technologi-
cally robust boundary is either necessary or sufficient, in every case, to
warrant imposing liability for exceeding that boundary. The question,
instead, is whether the boundary is implemented in a way that fairly
signals to information users that they are crossing a legally significant.
boundary. Second, I use the term "foreseeability" to unify the doc-
trinal suggestions that follow, but I do not propose that a literal fore-
seeability requirement be added in any particular doctrinal sense.
Doctrinally; foreseeability is foreign to the question of the existence of
an enforceable agreement, and to interpretation of the DMCA and
the CFAA. As trespass is a tort, foreseeability is a related concept, but
in tort law foreseeability is related to the defendant's intent, and tradi-
tional trespass-to-chattels (and trespass-to-land) doctrine recognizes
the concept of "intent" in only a limited way. 307 The link among the
four doctrines, and between the doctrines and foreseeability, lies at
the level of interests, rather than doctrine, and particularly in the in-
terest. in regulation of access to information. 308 All four doctrines ad-
5 See generally Alfred C. Yen, A Personal Injury Law Perspective on Copyright in an Internet
Age, 52 14AsTINcs L J. 929 (2001) (considering policies supporting strict liability in per-
sonal injury in the context of claims for copyright infringement).
2" In some of the cases discussed above, it appears likely that the plaintiffs were willing
to accept some level of access by the defendants but could not, without litigation, persuade
the defendants to pay the desired price. See, e.g., eBay v. Bidders' Edge, Inc., 100 F. Stipp.
2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
587 Sec RESTATEMENT (SECON3)) Or TORTS § 217 ant. c (1965); KEETON ET At.., supra
note 180, § 13, at 73-74; sec also supra notes 141, 177-180, 301-303 and accompanying text.
"8 To the extent that each doctrine addresses a distinct interest, then boundaries be-
tween the doctrines ought to be preserved, even reinforced, rather than eliminated. Sec
O'Rourke, supra note 41, at 686. Common usage of place-and-space metaphors, and sub-
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dress that interest mostly as a tort interest. 309 The plaintiffs in each of
the cases described above argue that the defendants breached a duty
not to access the plaintiffs' information without permission.") The
source of the duty may have been contractual, statutory, or explicitly
based in tort. 3n In none of these areas does the evidence or the doc-
trine suggest that a regime of true strict liability (liability without fault
and without actual or constructive knowledge of ensuing harm) is ap-
propriate.312
 Yet uncritical reliance on the Internet-as-place metaphor
has pushed courts strongly in that direction. By encouraging reliance
on "visible" restrictions on access, the foreseeability standard pre-
serves application of the metaphors, in the context of an appropriate
and consistent application of the law. The rest of this Part describes
how the foreseeability concept could be accommodated in existing
doctrines, and responds to some anticipated criticisms.
A. Applications
I. Click-Through Agreements
Click-through doctrine, at least as described through the Spada v.
Netscape Communications Cotp. decision, now recognizes the impor-
tance of a foreseeability concept, even if it does not do so in so many
words. 3 " Moreover, the manner in which the court in Specht con-
cluded that the information provider (Netscape) could not enforce
an agreement to arbitrate closely tracks the sense in which I argue
stantially overlapping application of access-regulating sources of law, suggest that with re-
spect to access and use of information itself, harmonization is the better course.
xi' Cf. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429,452-53 (2d Cir. 2001) (de-
scribing breach as circumvention of locked door in DNICA suit); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeiden-
berg. 86 F.3d 1447,1450 (7th Cif. 1996) (describing breach in context of contract claim
riot to access information); eBay, 100 F. Stipp. 2d at 1068 (describing breach in context of
trespass to chattels by accessing information).
310 see, g Corky, 273 F.3d at 452-53; ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450; eBay, 100 F. Stipp. 2d at
1068.
311 See, e.g., Carley, 273 F.3d at 452-53; ProCD, 86 F.3t1 at 1450; eBay, 100 F. Stipp. 2d at
1068.
312
 A strict liability regime is not a part of click-through contract law. See discussion sit-
pro Part ILA. Strict liability is not suggested in the MICA, see supra notes 182-198 and ac-
companying text, or in the CFAA, see supra notes 224-236 and accompanying text. Neither
is it suggested in the doctrine of trespass to chattels or trespass to land. See supm notes 141,
177-180.301-303 and accompanying text.
313
	 F.3d 17.29-31 (2d Cir. 2002); see also supra notes 125-127 and accompanying
text.
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that foreseeability implements a sense of visibility of the Internet. 3"
The information users in Specht were not bound to Netscape's pro-
posed agreement because that agreement was presented online with-
out any contextual cues that signaled that proceeding further online
constituted a legally significant act. 315 The fact that these users could
download Netscape's software without being required to assent to a
click-through mechanism was a compelling indicator that they were
not presented with an opportunity to assent to Netscape's terms that
was meaningful in the context of the transaction.m The technological
mechanism that Netscape used (or failed to use) was not determina-
tive. 317 More important was the fact that the users in this case did not
have a vocabulary to understand the potential legal significance of
their actions. Specht, in short, rightly focuses on the context of the in-
formation user's knowledge of and access to terms that the informa-
tion proprietor might later rely on to limit that user's rights. 318
A foreseeability analysis, in one sense, simply adopts the ap-
proach followed in Specht.319 It also emphasizes a different dimension
of the result in Specht, without relying so heavily on its doctrinal
framework. The court in Specht was talking about assent, and using the
absence of relevant context to draw a conclusion about whether the
314 Sec Specht, 306 F.3d at 29-31; sec also supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
313 Sec Specht, 306 F.3d at 29-31; see also supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
318 See Specht, 306 F.3d at 29-31; see also supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
317 See Specht, 306 F,3d at 29-31; see also supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
318 Effective arguments regarding the proper scope of federal preemption of copyright
claims have been frustrated by courts' failure to require that non-preempted contracts
regarding copyrighted works constitute genuine agreements. PmCD v. Z,eidenberg. 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996), has been heavily criticized in the copyright community for its .simplis-
tic analysis of the argument that the contract claim in that case was preempted by federal
copyright law. See Nimmer et al., supra note 68, at 42-60. See generally Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY
Ttcti. L.J. 53 (1997). Scholars have urged that courts develop more sophisticated tools for
understanding both preemption and related doctrines to limit claims of exclusive control
over copyrighted works. Sec generally Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy
of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. Rev. 111 (1999).
319 A variety of contracts scholars have argued that enforceability of terms in form con-
tracts presented to consumers should he limited to "salient" or "visible" terms. Sec Barnett,
supra note 48, at 637-39 (arguing for "radically unexpected terms" review of form terms,
with respect to individual party); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality and Unconscionabil-
ity: A Behavioral Approach to Policing Farm Contracts, 70 U. Cm. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003),
draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=367172 (recommending enforcement of
form terms that are visible to a significant number of buyers); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1174,1251-53 (1983) (recommend-
ing enforcement of "visible" terms).
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plaintiffs had assented to the terms proposed by Netscape.s" Given
the precedential material before the court, this is understandable, but
it should be recognized that doctrinally the court is perpetuating the
contract-as-assent metaphor. The case can be better understood as the
right kind of application of the Internet-as-place metaphor. In this
framework, Netscape would argue that the information users—includ-
ing all those who visited the Netscape site, not just the plaintiffs—
"went" someplace in order to access the Netscape software, and by
going there implicitly recognized the limitations of that place. 321
According to the court, Netscape never signaled to those users that
any significant change in venue had occurred. 322 For future contract-
based disputes, therefore, a foreseeability standard derived from the
Internet-as-place metaphor should be a useful tool supporting the
type of substantive (if not metaphorical) analysis pursued in Spec/U. 323
my Sec Specht, 306 F.3d at 29-31.
521 In the context of certain common carrier agreements, a comparable rule, enforc-
ing form terms only if they are presented to the consumer in a manner that reasonably
communicated to the consumer notice of those terms, has been in place for many years.
See Deiro v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 816 F.2d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1987); Shankles v. Costa Anna-
tori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861, 864 (1st Cir. 1983); Silvestri v. Italia Societa Per Azione Di Naviga-
zione, 388 F.2d 11, 17 (2d Cir. 1968). The doctrine arose initially in the context of limita-
tions on liability found in passenger tickets (and thus as a form of federal common law
applied in maritime cases), and has been extended recently to limitations on liability of-
fered by shippers. See Mudd-Lyntan Sales & Serv. Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 236 F. Stipp.
2d 907, 910-11 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Shorts v. United Parcel Serv.. No. CIVA3:97-CV-0682R,
1999 14TL 118791, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 1999), alp,  204 F.3d 1114 (5th Cir. 1999);
Vieira v. United Parcel Ser•., Inc., No. G95-04697, 1996 WE, 478686, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
5. 1996). Proof of "reasonable notice" requires meeting two standards. First, the propo-
nent of the terms must show that notice was adequate given the physical characteristic of
the ticket, including size of the type. conspicuousness of the terms, and clarity of the no-
tice on the face of the ticket. See Deiro, 816 F.2d at 1364. Second, notice must adequate in
light of the circumstances surrounding the passenger's purchase and retention of the
ticket, including the customer's sophistication, time and incentives to consider the terms
of the ticket, and any other notice that the customer received outside of the ticket itself. Id.
The customer, under all the circumstances, must have had the ability to become meaning-
fully informed. See id.; Carpenter v. Kloster Rederi A/S. 601 F.2d 11, 12-13 (5th Cir. 1979);
Silvestri, 388 F.2d at 17 (IT] he thread that runs implicitly through the cases sustaining
incorporation is that the steamship line had done all it reasonably could to warn the pas-
senger that the terms and conditions were important matters of contract affecting his legal
rights."). This line of cases has been all but ignored in analysis of shrinkwrap and click-
through agreements. But see generally Kama's' M. Das, Note, Forum-Selection Clauses in Con-
sumer Clielaorap and Browsewrap Agreements and the "Reasonably Communicated" Test, 77 Wssi i.
L. REV. 481 (2002).
322 See Specht, 306 F.3d at 31.
523 To take the example most likely to provoke debate in the near future, enforceability
of browse-wrap "agreements," assent to browse-wrap terms may be inferred either by "use"
of an information resource with 'awareness" of terms of use, or by "acceptance" of the
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2. Trespass to Chattels
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, on which the recent electronic
trespass cases rely, requires that the defendant intentionally dispossess,
use, or intermeddle with the plaintiffs chattel before liability may be
imposed.324 Courts have given lip service to the intentionality re-
quirement in these cases, interpreting the requirement as courts tra-
ditionally have interpreted "intent" in the context of claims of trespass
to land.325 In eBay, Inc. v. Bidders' Edge, Inc., the necessary intent was
inferred from the fact that the defendant's automated search agent
bypassed a "robots.txt." file (a non-mandatory electronic request em-
heckled in the plaintiffs software that. the defendant's software was at
liberty, as a technological matter, toy ignore), 320 and from the fact of
the filing of the claim, 327 In Intel Comp. Hamidi, Hatnicirs intent to
trespass was demonstrated by Intel's giving him actual notice that lie
should not send e-mails "through" Intel's computer network. 328 Apply-
ing the foreseeability standard, the intent requirement should be
made substantive. Intent would have to be shown by evidence that in
the ordinary course of operating and using the plaintiff's computer
"benefit" of the resource along with implied limitations on that benefit. Each argument
may be contested on traditional contract terms, because it can be fairly debated in each
case whether an individual user manifested "assent" by "using' or taking the "benefit" of
access to the inlOrmation. The foreseeability standard would require an additional analytic
step in this case, asking whether the information proprietor took steps to make users aware
of any specific "use" or "benefit" of access to information limited by terms and conditions
of access. It is typically far from clear that "visiting" a Web site, for example, that is, merely
reading and surfing, consists of the sort of "use" of an information resource that would not
be provided without implied terms and conditions. It cannot be presumed that informa-
tion users understand that they receive an identifiable "benefit" from access to an elec-
tronic information resource that may appear to be free (as with nutch of the World Wide
Web), or for which they may already have paid (as with access to the Internet via commer-
cial service providers, or with copies of computer programs).
324 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF	 § 217 (1965).
325 In trespass-to-land cases, the plaintiff must show no more than that the defendant
intended to be where the defendant was. See supra notes 301-303 and accompanying text.
326 See sit pro note 147 and accompanying text (discussing operation of Standard for
Robots Exclusion).
527 100 F. Stipp. 2d at 1068-72.
325 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244,250 (Ct. App. 2001), review granted. 43 P.3d 587 (Cal. 2002).
An "actual notice" standard suggests that "constructive notice" might also suffice. In the
electronic context, this may be even less fair to potential defendants, and even less consis-
tent with the Internet-as-place metaphor. See Speeht, 306 F.3d at 31 (declining to hold user
to "constructive notice" of Netscape's offered terms). But see McLaren v. Microsoft Corp.,
1999 WL 339015, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. May 28, 1999) (finding that an employer "owned" an
employee's personal e-mail messages in part because they were stored on a corporate
computer network).
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facilities, a significant number of users in the defendant's position
necessarily knew or should have known that they were crossing sonic
culturally significant boundary. Proof of service of a complaint (or
delivery of a cease-and-desist demand) objecting to access by the de-
fendant, standing alone, would be insufficient. Either of these forms
of notice is no better than the evidence on which courts relied in eBay
and latel, for example. An electronic device or other technology de-
signed to prevent such access, that did prevent such access, and that
signaled in some way that access was prohibited, would suffice, but
electronic devices, computer programs, and access keys and the like
would not if they could be ignored or bypassed in the ordinary course
of the user's attempting to obtain access to the information.
The difference between this proposal for the electronic envi-
ronment and its equivalent in the physical environment (in which a
"No Trespassing" sign or a cease-and-desist demand letter typically
gives prospective trespassers adequate notice, if any is required, of an
impending tort) is precisely the interest captured by the foreseeability
standard. In real space, individuals encounter and are accustomed to
encountering a variety of signs and signifiers that mark significant
boundaries. A fence or a "No Trespassing" sign exists as part of a
larger cultural vocabulary indicating, among other things, places that
individuals may or may not, can and cannot, and should and should
not, go. Absent a more pronounced rule for trespass on the Internet,
no equivalent vocabulary is likely to arise. 329 A mere "No Trespassing"
"sign" on the Internet, such as the robots.txt file relied on by the
court in eBay, is easily ignored as a triviality on the Internet as a whole.
Claims for trespass to land do not formally require that the de-
fendant have advance knowledge or notice of the plaintiff's property
interest,330 and in that respect the proposal goes beyond a mere anal-
ogy to existing trespass doctrine. To the extent that this doctrine in
the land context is driven by an implicit argument about the relatively
low cost to the defendant of obtaining information about the scope of
the plaintiff's interest, 33 ' then extension of the foreseeability standard
in the virtual realm is justified. It cannot safely be said that an infor-
329
 The rule thus both substitutes for missing imageability on the Internet and creates
an incentive to develop one. The Standard for Robots Exclusion, for example, now permits
only an "access/no access" signal that does not discriminate among different types of
automated programs. Standard for Robots Exclusion, at Imp://wwwrobotstxt,org (last
visited Nov. 15, 2002).
33° See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
"I See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
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mation user has at hand a low-cost, easily understood method of de-
termining the scope of an information proprietor's rights. 332 The
higher the user's information, the more the liability regime should
require proof of the user's knowledge.
3. Anti-Circumvention and the DMCA
Section 1201 of the DMCA appears to be a "strict liability" regime
for circumventing technical protection measures and for trafficking in
anti-circumvention technology. 333 The accused defendant is liable if
the evidence establishes that "effective" technical protection measures
were circumvented, or anti-circumvention technology "designed or
produced" for circumvention purposes or with "limited commercially
significant" non-circumvention purposes was trafficked 111.334 There
seems to be little room in the statutory text for a requirement that a
potential defendant have advance knowledge of potential DMCA li-
ability."'
The statute does require that the subject technical protection
measure be "effective" before a remedy (for circumvention, or for
trafficking) can be granted." 8 The meaning of "effective" is not per-
fectly clear. "Effective" has two, closely related statutory definitions."7
First, in the context of access control technology, it means that "the
measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the applica-
tion of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of
the copyright owner, to gain access to the work." 338 Second, in the
context of copy control technology, it means that "the measure, in the
ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits
the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under this title." 3" As
noted above, courts have been extremely generous in their reading of
these definitions. 340 The legislative history of the DMCA suggests that.
Congress was primarily concerned with large-scale piracy of copy-
333 See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARnozo ARTS & ENT. 11,..1.29,34—
35 (1994),
333 Sec 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000); sec also supra notes 182-198 and accompanying text.
334 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2) (A). (B). The anti-trafficking statute is also violated if the de-
fendant knows that the technology will be used to circtiniventtechnological protection
measures.
335 See id.
3343 See id. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (a) (2), (b)(1).
337 See id. § 1201(a) (3) (B), (h) (2) (B),
"8 Id. § 1201(a) (3)(B),
335 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2) (B).
34° Sec supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text.
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righted works.341 Given the property metaphors on which Congress
relied, it is reasonable, and consistent with what the legislative history
reveals regarding Congressional intent, to argue that a property
owner is entitled to strong protection against burglary to the extent
that the owner has taken significant steps to safeguard the property
within. Metaphorically, the door need not have three separate dead-
bolts and a steel frame, but there should be a door of some sort, the
key should not be tinder the front mat, and the property should be
behind it. A DMCA plaintiff cannot simply declare that something is a
locked "house," That thing must signify "house" to the user commu-
nity. A measure ought not to be "effective," and a remedy under the
DMCA ought not to be available, if the plaintiffs technological meas-
ure can be defeated with relative ease. Giving real meaning to the ef-
fectiveness requirement would be an appropriate way to locate the
foreseeability standard in the DMCA, because an "effective" technical
protection measure would be, among other things, a measure that
gives notice that significantly more than ordinary operation of the
technology embodying or carrying the information is required to ac-
. cess the relevant information.342
4. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Civil liability under the CFAA requires that the defendant have
accessed the plaintiffs computer or computer network "knowingly" or
"intentionally," "without authorization," or have exceeded "authorized
access," and either caused the requisite harm or obtained informa-
tion. 343 These terms beg the question of the type of evidence needed
to demonstrate that the defendant "knew" that authority to access the
plaintiff's computer system was lacking or "intended" to proceed de-
spite a lack of access. Aside from dicta in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefet;
Coip.,344
 courts in recent civil CFAA cases discussed above have
341 See H.R. REP, No. 105-551, pt. I, at 17 (1998); S. REP. No. 105-90, at 11 (1998).
5v2 A similar argument was rejected by the district court in Universal City Studios. Inc. v.
Reirnerdes, 111 F. Stipp. 2d 294, 317-19 (S.D.N.I: 2000), affil sub non., Universal City Stu-
dios. Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), on the ground that this characterization of
-effective" would render the DMCA meaningless. Evidence of circumvention would dem-
onstrate that the technological measure was not "effective," thereby legalizing the circum-
vention. The court was wrong not to recognize a spectrum of effectiveness, and wrong not
to require proof by the plaintiff that its technology lay toward the strong end of that spec-
trum. But see supra note 46 (raising concerns about integration of technology and informa-
tion content).
943 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2), (a) (5) (2000).
544 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2003).
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skipped the question almost entirely, focusing instead on the scope of
authorized access. In Registencom, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the court inferred
the defendant's lack of authority from non-binding Terms of Service
posted on the plaintiff's Web site, thus importing into the CFAA the
weakness of pre-Specht click-through law, and from the fact that the
lawsuit was brought, thus importing an equivalent weakness from
trespass doctrine.345 In EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., the court
inferred lack of authority from a nondisclosure agreement between
the plaintiff and its former employee, one of the defendants. 346 Such
an agreement might, in some circumstances, be considered sufficient
warning of a potential access violation, so long as the subject matter
identified in the agreement in fact encompassed the "confidential"
information that is the subject of the CFAA claim. In Explorica, the
agreement in question did not speck that information. 347
One could imagine amending the CFAA to impose a sort of mens
rea requirement for civil claims and thereby curing ambiguities re-
garding "knowledge" and "intent."348 An amendment ought not to be
necessary, if courts take seriously the requirement that a CFAA defen-
dant's access be "without authorization" or have "exceeded author-
ized access." 349 In practical terms, this involves shifting a burden. As
courts now interpret the authority requirement, so little evidence of
absent authority will suffice that, in effect, authority is absent unless
affirmatively granted by the information proprietor. 350 Nothing in the
345 Sec 126 F. Stipp. 2d 238. 249 (S.D.N,1; 2000),
316 SCC 274 F.3d 577, 582 (1st Cir. 2001).
347 See id.
313 Civil liability might even he eliminated altogether, although that prospect seems
remote. Alternatively, one might imagine raising a "vagueness" objection to all or part of
the statute. Such objections to the CFAA and to stale criminal anti-hacking statutes have
generally been rejected. Decisions rejecting vagueness arguments include United States a.
Fernandez, No. 92 CR 563 (R0), 1993 WL 88197 (S.D.N.N: Mar. 25, 1993); People v. Hawkins,
121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Ct. App. 2002); Commonwealth is Farley, No. 95934, 1996 WL 1180936
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 1996); State v. Washington. 710 N.E. 2d 307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998);
and State a. Johnson, No. 59190, 1992 INT 25312 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1992). Vagueness
arguments have been accepted in Commonwealth v. Coeke, 58 S.W. 3d 891 (Ky. Ct. App.
2001), and State v. Awl; 539 So, 2d 1222 (La, 1989).
319 The CFAA defines "exceeds authorized access" in circular terms: "IT] he term 'ex-
ceeds authorized access' means to access a computer with authorization and to use such
access to obtain or alter information hi the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to
obtain or alter." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (6) (2000).
555 See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding, in a crimi-
nal CFAA case, that intent requirement was satisfied by intentional access to computers
beyond scope of authority, despite defendant's authority to access other computers on the
network); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F, Stipp, 2d
1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (concluding under common-law agency principles that
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statute requires this result. 3" Implementing the foreseeability stan-
dard involves first shifting the burden of proof regarding the lack of
authority to the plaintiff, and then requiring meaningful evidence of
absent authority (such as an acknowledged click-through agreement,
actual pre-access knowledge of the plaintiff's interest, or an effective
technological measure limiting access) from the plaintiff. As in the
discussions of click-through and trespass cases above, however, that
evidence should not go solely to the defendant's knowledge, but in-
stead to the understanding of the group of users of which the defen-
dant is a member. Zefer does not represent the correct approach.
B. Objections and Limitations
1. Problems Not. Solved
I have argued that courts mistakenly rely on the Internet-as-place
metaphor to permit information proprietors to restrict access to
computer facilities based on protected interests in those facilities,
whereas in practice these plaintiffs are concerned with access to in-
formation itself. A foreseeability standard that. implements a robust
metaphorical sense of place allows those parties a sophisticated tool
for self-protection with respect to both physical and information re-
sources. The solution, in short, appears not to address one of the key
weaknesses of the Internet-as-place metaphor—that it permits courts
to obscure important distinctions between interests in tangible prop-
erty and interests in intangible property. The analysis focuses, in other
words, on assuring that use of metaphors is accurate, without address-
ing whether the results that would follow from its recommendations
are correct.
Operation of the foreseeability standard on the physical charac-
teristics of the information environment should not be read as fore-
closing concern for virtual characteristics. Yet direct, boundary-based
regulation of the electronic intangibles themselves is expensive, 352
frustrating,353 or (sometimes, and) ineffective. 3" Regulation that fo-
employees lost authority to access computer system after acquiring interest adverse to em-
ployer).
35 ' Sce18 U.S.C. § 1030.
852 Preemption and misuse arguments, for example, are litigated as defenses to claims
of infringement brought by information proprietors.
953 Frustrating is a term that aptly characterizes both efforts to enact ucrrA (and be-
fore it, Article 2B of the UCC) as a uniform law of software licensing and to encourage
reliance on enacted federal and uniform state statutes approving the use of electronic
20031	 Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet 	 503
cases on the physical as a proxy for the virtual attempts to restore
some of the regulatory benefits that tangibility once provided. Noth-
ing in the proposal forecloses resort to information-specific doctrines
such as federal preemption355 of rights available under state law, or
misuse of copyright or patent rights, 356 or the first sale doctrine in
copyright law, for example. 357 The point of the proposal is to make
application of those doctrines less subject to ambiguity caused by fail-
ures to distinguish between tangible and intangible interests. The
standard does not necessarily solve all of the problems created by
click-through cases, trespass to chattels, the DMCA, and the CFAA.
Particularized applications of the standard in the context of each doc-
trine remain to be worked out, and additional regulation of access to
information (distinguished from access to information storage) may
be appropriate hi each case.
signatures in commercial transactions. See UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT OF
1999, available at http://wwwlaw.upenn.edu/b11/tdc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.1um;  Elec-
tronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (ESIGN), see also 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7001-7006, 7021 (2000). The former has been mired in controversy for years. The latter
have been largely ignored.
354 COMPM Gordon, supra note 291, at 1380-84 (arguing that modern copyright's vir-
tual boundaries serve as a proxy for older protections offered by limits of.,tangible copies
of works), with Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property
and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Lone, 10 DEPAut.-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.
& Potfv 283, 289 11.15 (2000) ("[Ms a practical matter, legislation, international trade
agreements and even judicial decisions have chosen to ignore those theoretical boundaries




U.S.C, § 301 (2000).
356 The proposal in the text encourages the development of boundaries or other
points of visibility or salience in cyberspace. but nothing mandates that those boundaries
be established, initially, in their proper places. In cases of overreaching, public policy
should step in. Preemption of slate contract law by federal copyright law, for example,
plays an important role in maintaining boundaries within appropriate limits. But see Bow-
ers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that
shrinkwrap agreement barring reverse engineering of computer program may be enforced
notwithstanding conflict with copyright law). Different access doctrines might preempt
one another. Sec Hardy, supra note 140,11 10, 13 (both suggesting that trespass-to-chattels
claims ma)' be preempted by copyright law to the extent that they address copying of in-
formation); O'Rourke, supra note 41, at 590. Public policy limitations may be supplied by
sources beyond intellectual property law. See People V. Network Assocs., Inc., No.
400590/02, slip op. at 6-9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 2003), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/
UCITA_UCC2B/spitzerw-network•assic.pdf (enjoining enforcement of license term pro-
hibiting unauthorized reviews of computer program because license terms represented
deceptive acts in the conduct of business). For a compelling argument supporting exten-
sion of misuse principles to the DMCA, see generally Burk, supra note 212.
357 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
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2. Negative External Effects
The foreseeability standard encourages use of more robust tech-
nical and other barriers to access to information. To that extent, the
standard is associated with the negative consumer-related externalities
associated generally with reliance on private contract and related
measures used to limit access to information. In economic terms, con-
sumer benefits from information access exist partly because of man-
datory rules preserving such access, and partly because information
proprietors do not have the benefit of rules that state precisely when
they may legally limit such access. 358 Application of the former princi-
ple can be addressed by the argument presented in the preceding sec-
tion, because the foreseeability standard should increase the effec-
tiveness of mandatory information access principles.
The second point, that external benefits from information pro-
duction and consumption arise because of fuzziness in the law, raises
an important issue if one assumes that the inevitable tendency of the
world of information proprietors is to increase barriers to informa-
tion access. 359
 As a practical matter, it is difficult to conceive of a world
of information production in which information proprietors have
more incentives to privatize their works than they do currently. At
worst, the _level of private efforts to limit access would remain con-
stant, and both the effectiveness of such efforts and their cost to in-
formation proprietors would increase. It is difficult to see how infor-
mation users would be made worse off. By contrast, the need for
alternative strategies to regulate access, and for the ability to apply
those strategies effectively, would become clearer.
The shift to a foreseeability standard and any corresponding in-
crease in the costs associated with proprietors' efforts to limit access
might also lead to more measured use of access restrictions and to
corresponding consumer benefits. The foreseeability standard is in-
tended to reinforce the notion of salience of limits on access, rather
s" SeeJulie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VANE). L. REV. 1799, 1807-08
(2000); William IV, Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CIII.-KENT L. REV.
1203. 1240-46 (1998); Michael J. Madison, Complexity and Copyright in Contradiction, 18
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 140-44 (2000).
359
 More abstractly, it is possible that the argument does not give sufficient credit to the
risk of anticommons. A property regime that permits maintenance of too many boundaries
runs the risk of stifling innovation and development, rather than encouraging it through
appropriate management of privatization incentives. See generally Michael A. Heller. The
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than to give information proprietors more effective ammunition in
arguing for their existence. Imageability in urban planning supposes
not that every street serves as a barrier, but that some physical features
are salient in a given landscape and are therefore deserving of special
recognition in the planning calculus."° Some are salient because of
their privatizing characteristics. 361 Others are salient because of their
role in constructing or defining public space. 362 In either case, image-
ability is costly, both economically and cognitively. Not every apparent
landmark counts. By analogy, not every boundary can be an effective
access control. It has been observed more generally that the social
harms caused by expansive rights in information can best be limited
by clearly defining the scope of those rights, via legal doctrine if pos-
sible, and via mechanical restraint if need be. 363
3. The End-to-End Principle and The Dynamic Internet
The essence of the Internet, if it has an essence, lies in the tech-
nology of openness that underlies it and the culture of openness that.
the technology facilitates and signifies. The argument from openness
suggests that both structure and culture lead to worthwhile innova-
tion and invention that would otherwise be limited by "traditional," or
controlled, information production and distribution systems. 364 Inno-
vation is supported technically because, as a default matter, the Inter-
net does not preclude users from experimenting with its capabilities.
The technical infrastructure of the Internet relies on a core principle
360 Sec supra notes 274-285 and accompanying text.
361 Sec supra notes 274-285 and accompanying text.
36 '2 See supra notes 274-285 and accompanying text.
363 Wendy Gordon has made this argument in the context of copyright law. See Wendy
J. Gordon. A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533,1606-08 (1993); see also Timothy P. Terrell & Jane S.
Smith, Publicity. Liberty. and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the
Inheritability Issue, 34 Entottv U. 1,28-32 (1985) (arguing that property rights in general
can be understood as manifestations of "ffiingness" or "specificity"). More abstractly, mere
"zoning" of the Internet should ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the foreseenbility stan-
dard. See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 Entokv LJ. 869,883-95
(1996) (observing that the Internet is capable of and is in fact being "zoned"); see also
Reno v. ACLU. 521 U.S. 844,890 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (relying on Professor Lessig's work to suggest that zoning of the Internet is desir-
able and, by extending principles guiding zoning of real property, possible).
364 See Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE	 1783, 1790-91
(2002).
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of "end-to-end" connectivity. 365 Other things being equal, network
traffic should encounter interpretive activity (discrimination based on
its content) at the "ends* of the network, or at user nodes, rather than
at locations closer to its core. 566 Networked electronic information
should be distinguished and interpreted by different end-user soft-
ware applications, for example, rather than by firewall software. A le-
gal perspective that rewards information proprietors who build strong
boundaries on the Internet appears to interfere both technically and
culturally with these frameworks for innovation.
The foreseeability standard need not conflict with the end-to-end
principle, if that principle is accepted as a guiding public policy. Visi-
ble barriers to access can be implemented in any number of ways,
many if not most of them manifested at or near the application
level. 367 Generally, and for the reasons described in the preceding sec-
tion, the foreseeability standard should be understood not as an im-
pediment to innovation and invention, but as a measured attempt to
protect the Internet as a field of innovation from encroachment by
the Internet-as-place metaphor interpreted in absolute terms. It is
possible that the world of information would be a better place if there
were no boundaries or barriers anywhere on the Internet. Such a
world is not among the choices we face. The policy and legal choice is
not between a world of no boundaries and a world of measured
boundaries. It is between a world of measured boundaries and a world
of absolute boundaries, where all access comes at a price, measured
either ex ante or (increasingly, and without warning) ex post. 368 Being
able to see the shape of the Internet ought to be a relatively small
price to pay in exchange for the former.
CONCLUSION
The dominant metaphor governing discussion and legal analysis
of information-related problems on the Internet can be translated
365
 The origins of the principle as a technical guideline for systems development, and
its application to Internet policy, are reviewed in Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig. The
End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Thoadband Era. 48 UCLA L.
REV. 925,930-33 (2001).
366 Id.
367 See Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA, L. REV, 1163,1184-88
(1999).
368 This concern with ex post rather than ex ante regulation mirrors that expressed by
critics of the electronic self-help provision found in an earlier version of UCITA. See Julie
E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECIL L.J. 1089,1115-18
(1998).
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into legal doctrine in ways that address both producer and consumer
interests in access to information. That translation can be accoim
plished by linking our metaphorical appreciation of place to our
common experience of physical place. There are some important as-
sumptions built into that link, assumptions that are unprovable but
are based on observation and experience. Our language and our ex-
perience share cognitive sources, The meaning of our metaphors re-
mains essentially constant across context. And both metaphor and
experience do and therefore should guide legal analysis. I argue that
our common experience (i.e., that places are freely accessible when
they appear to be so, and that landmarks and boundaries of various
sorts signal the existence of limits) is relevant to what we mean by
place metaphors, and that both that experience and that meaning
ought to be carried over not only to our experience of electronic
place but also to our legal analysis of electronic place. The burden of
exclusion from information ought to fall more concretely on the in-
formation proprietor on the Internet—as it does, in practice, in the
tangible world. A unifying standard, foreseeability, can be abstracted
from that proposition and interpreted in the context of legal doc-
trines of contract, trespass, the DMCA, and the CFAA, now used to
regulate access to information. Idiosyncratic issues would remain to
be worked out in the context of each doctrine, and in the context of
others used for the same purpose. Those idiosyncrasies should not
obscure the fact that what we face presently is an unrecognized and
inconsistent law of access to electronic information. The approach
presented here represents a start towards making sense of that law.
